United Nations S/2013/491

Security Council

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Letter dated 14 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to my letter dated 13 May 2013 (S/2013/283), by which I informed the Council of the heinous crime committed by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) of Gibril Ibrahim, in Pamina, inside the territory of Chad, when it assassinated Commander Mohamed Bashar and other members of his movement, and with reference to the condemnation by the Security Council of the incident embodied in paragraph 7 of Council resolution 2113 (2013) of 30 July 2013, I have the honour to enclose herewith the report of the extraordinary meeting of the monitoring committee on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, held in Doha on 4 June 2013, which was devoted exclusively to the tragic assassination of Mr. Bashar and some members of his group (see annex).

It is worth mentioning that the meeting overwhelmingly condemned the assassination incident and labelled the JEM Gibril Ibrahim faction as a terrorist group. Therefore, the Government of the Sudan urges the Security Council to label the JEM Gibril Ibrahim faction a terrorist group, and also urges the Council to call upon all Member States, particularly those providing refuge and assistance to members of the JEM Gibril Ibrahim faction, to expel them and refrain from providing any kind of assistance to them.

I would be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali **Osman**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 14 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Report on the deliberations of the extraordinary meeting of the monitoring committee on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

1. The extraordinary meeting of the monitoring committee on the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur took place in Doha, Qatar, on 4 June 2013.

2. The meeting was chaired by Ahmed Bin Abdalla Al Mahmoud, Deputy Prime Minister of the State of Qatar, and the following members of the committee participated:

- Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, Foreign Minister of Chad
- The assistant to the Foreign Minister of Egypt on the Sudan
- Mr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Joint Representative of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
- Mr. Salah Haleema, Representative of the League of Arab States in the Sudan
- Representatives of the United Nations, the African Union (AU), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the European Union (EU)
- Representatives of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, Canada, Japan and China

3. The meeting was devoted to the assassination of Mohamed Bashar, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (a signatory faction of the peace agreement), and his Deputy, Arko Sulieman Dahia, and some members of his group, in the Pamina region in Chadian territory on 12 May 2013.

4. Minister Al Mahmoud initiated the meeting by welcoming the participants, indicating that the meeting came during a delicate stage of the Darfur peace process and in the wake of the assassination of some leaders from the Justice and Equality Movement by the Gibril Ibrahim faction after they opted for peace. He said the incident was a heinous crime targeting Darfurians who inclined to peace, affirming that such acts would only make them more determined to pursue the peace process to its end. He added that what hurt most was that the Gibril Ibrahim faction not only rejected negotiations and the peace process but also targeted those elements which opt for peace and relinquish war. Minister Al Mahmoud called upon the international community to condemn the crime, which has been condemned by international organizations and bodies, as it constitutes a violation of international peace and security. He also called for tracking down the perpetrators and bringing them to justice as well as exerting pressure to release the abducted. He stressed that civilians must not be assaulted.

5. Minister Al Mahmoud further added that the first executive mechanism would meet in Khartoum on 9 June 2013 and that it would implement the development projects approved by the donor conference held in Doha in April, as well as the

recovery programme, pointing out that Qatar had already remitted the money it had pledged to the mechanism's account.

6. Mr. Chambas said that the meeting was dedicated to a discussion of the assassination of the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, a signatory of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. He had ascertained that the assaulted group had been crossing from Chad to Western Darfur when the Gibril Ibrahim faction carried out the assassination. He pointed out that the assault and assassinations had taken place in Chadian territory with a view to intimidating others to renounce the Doha Document and the peace option, and then he submitted a detailed report on the incident.

7. Altom Sulieman Mohamed, representative of the Justice and Equality Movement, signatory of the Doha Document, explained how the assassination had taken place, indicating that the martyrs were 10 in number and the abducted 34, while the survivors numbered 10, including himself. He said that the aggressors had seized three loaded trucks leased from Chadian citizens, and five other leased vehicles carrying some leaders of the movement. He concluded by demanding the setting up of an international inquiry commission to investigate this terrorist crime committed by Gibril Ibrahim forces, adding that his movement had commissioned commander-in-chief Abdelkarim Dabjo to manage the movement's affairs for 60 days until finalizing its structures. He also reaffirmed his movement's commitment to peace and to what had been agreed upon in Doha.

8. The representative of OIC reaffirmed the support of OIC to the current peace process in Darfur, pointing out that OIC condemned the assassination and described it as criminal. He also renewed the call to the factions rejecting peace to join the peace process.

9. The EU representative said that the European Union had issued a statement on 16 May condemning the assassination, affirming support for the peace process in Darfur and calling upon the Gibril Ibrahim faction to release the abducted. She said that the European Union was concerned about the humanitarian situation in Darfur, adding that during the past four months, about 3,000 had been displaced as a result of violence, in addition to 12,000 already displaced as a result of attacks by the rebel movements and tribal conflicts. She pointed out that the victims had always been the civilian population and demanded that the non-signatory factions join the peace process. She also talked about disarming militias and about compensation, justice and human rights, demanding that dialogue in Darfur be comprehensive. She further indicated that some movements were active outside Darfur with the revolutionary front. She went on to say that the European Union supported a comprehensive political solution and sided with the call of President Al-Bashir in April in that respect. She concluded by saying that the European Union was present to denounce the tragic incident, which should be condemned by new and strong words, and that it always worked to assist any peace process.

10. The assistant of the Foreign Minister of Egypt for Sudan Affairs said there were groups that rejected peace and carried out abductions. They had abducted 21 displaced persons on their way to participate in a conference, and there was a coordinated escalation with the Revolutionary Front in North Kordofan to overthrow the Government. He continued to say that 10 years of war in Darfur had passed and the result was more famine and poverty. He added that the fighting between Sudanese forces and the forces of Arko Minni Minnawi had lately displaced

50,000 people, pointing out that the attacks had targeted civilians and infrastructure. He added that the meeting should condemn in an unequivocal manner the assassination and call upon the international community to condemn it. He also called upon international organizations to label the incident correctly as a terrorist act, and called for the perpetrators to be tracked down. He also called for upholding the development and rehabilitation projects in Darfur, pointing out that this would entail exerting pressure on the non-signatory factions.

11. The AU representative said that the Sudan issue was high on the agenda of the last AU summit. He considered the assassination of the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement and some members of his group on 12 May 2013 inside the territory of another country a blow to the peace process, and he considered it a cowardly attack. He pointed out that the African Union had issued a statement condemning the incident and considered it tragic and had called for tracking down the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. He also said that what had happened was a war crime, adding that the committee should speak with one voice and that its silence would be construed differently. He concluded by calling for the redoubling of peace efforts, saying that the terrorist incident would only increase insistence for peacebuilding.

12. Mr. Mahamat, Foreign Minister of Chad, described the incident as a heinous crime that must be condemned, pointing out that such crimes had been committed for the past 10 years. He said that there were elements that would threaten the peace process if attention were not paid to them. The Minister criticized the Chambas report and said he had neglected the role of Chad, adding that there was an influx of refugees to his country and within 45 days more than 50,000 of them had arrived in Chad. He went on to say that security in Darfur was weak and the relations between the Sudan and civil society was affected by what happened in Darfur, mentioning a document that contained all the demands of the people of Darfur. He added that some international reports equated the Government of the Sudan with rebel movements, although the latter killed people. He further said that his country hosted more than 300,000 refugees, and that some of them returned to their previous abode when the situation improved in Darfur, but made their way back to Chad when they felt that the situation was unstable. He concluded by calling for an evaluation of the peace process and of the position of the international community and its role towards what is happening, saying that sometimes one felt at a loss.

13. The representative of the Arab League, Mr. Haleema, said the League had issued a statement condemning the assassination and describing it as a terrorist act, demanding that the perpetrators be tracked down. He said that the crime aimed at assassinating the peace process, pointing out that condemning the Gibril Ibrahim faction was not sufficient, and he supported the setting up of an international commission of inquiry on the incident. He also commented on the intervention of the AU representative and said it embodied paradoxes, adding that some organizations practised a double standard in dealing with the Darfur crisis.

14. The representative of Canada commended the efforts of Qatar and UNAMID and said that Canada was concerned about the deteriorating situation in Darfur and the Sudan. At that point, Amin Hassan Omer, representative of the Sudan, interrupted, protesting that the representative had deviated from the agenda, which was devoted to the assassination of the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement. The representative said that she understood the desire to punish the perpetrators of the assassination incident and confirmed her country's support for these measures.

15. The representative of France condemned the tragic incident, saying that France considered it to be an unwarranted hostile and criminal incident targeting peace and security and the efforts exerted in that respect. He expressed, on behalf of France, condolences to families of the victims, and said the international community should condemn the incident in the strongest terms, that the perpetrators should be punished, that the peace process should continue and that efforts should be concentrated on halting violence. He said that France had continued to support the peace process in Darfur since its inception in Doha. He said that an end should be put to displacement, and that the brave people who opted for peace should be supported, while those who rejected peace should be dealt with strictly and firmly. First, though, they should be engaged in dialogue and peace talks.

16. The representative of the United Kingdom conveyed his country's full expression of condemnation, qualifying the incident as unacceptable and describing it not as a personal attack, but one which has a political agenda. He called for measures to be taken and emphasized peace, calling for the exertion of pressure on all parties to engage in the peace process. He said that it was necessary to create a positive cycle in Darfur, that there was a need to disarm militias and a need for justice and reconciliation, the settlement of land conflicts, the achievement of development and the honouring of commitments.

17. Amin Hassan Omer, representative of the Government of the Sudan, began by offering condolences in memory of the souls of the martyrs and commending Qatar, Chad and the organizations that had condemned the terrorist incident. He said that peace in Darfur faced challenges and witnessed progress but that attacks by rebel movements rejecting peace as well as tribal conflicts posed hurdles to the peace process. He said that what was needed was condemnation of the assassination, an inquiry and a trial, as this faction did not deny having committed the assassination, which he described as an act of terror, demanding that hostages held by the Gibril Ibrahim faction be set free. He proposed the formation of an offshoot committee to be chaired by Qatar to follow up on emergencies. He concluded by reaffirming the commitment of the Sudan to the agreement signed with the Justice and Equality Movement and establishing working relations with all partners.

18. Tigani Al Sissi, Head of the Darfur Regional Authority, expressed his appreciation for the role of Qatar in achieving peace and that of Chad in unifying the movements. He said the Gibril Ibrahim faction had been rejecting peace talks mainly because there were other factions, and it issued a statement to that effect despite its knowledge of the presence of the other movements. As for the faction of Abd Wahid, it had refused to recognize the Doha forum and the envoys. Mr. Sissi added that with the testimony of UNAMID, the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur had overwhelmingly been welcomed and rejoiced. He added that the Gibril Ibrahim faction had gone to South Sudan and started launching attacks from there, saying it had attacked Graida three times, leading to the death of many innocent people, and had attacked Labado and Muhajiriya, targeting the regional authority's projects in Marla. The Gibril Ibrahim faction had attacked the Western Salvation Highway numerous times. He added that if the Gibril Ibrahim faction is not addressed and dealt with, the Doha Document will not be implemented. He added that unless addressed, the Gibril Ibrahim faction would be enticed to commit further atrocities. He also expressed his fears about the attempts of certain circles to link Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile together, pointing out that this is rejected, as Darfur has its own forum in Doha, and those regions have their forum, in Addis Ababa. He concluded by saying that the assassination of Mohamed Bashar and some members

of his group should be not only condemned but also labelled as an act of terror similar to the act of terror committed in Toronto, Canada, by the group of Gibril against the late Bashar faction.

19. The Russian representative said that the assassination of Mr. Bashar and some members of his group was a blow to the peace process and that the current situation in Darfur was weak and fragile and the assassination should motivate more work towards peace, particularly while the peace process is still alive. He concluded by affirming his country's support for the peace process in Darfur, and commended Mr. Sissi's analysis and expressed his conviction that they were appropriate.

20. The representative of Japan strongly condemned the assassination of Mr. Bashar and some members of his group and called for exerting more efforts to bring peace to Darfur and putting more pressure on the factions rejecting peace.

21. The representative of the United States said that his country condemned the assassination and called for the release of the captives. He said that his country also renewed its call to resolve differences politically and not militarily, noting particularly that civil society had suffered tremendously and that the security situation was deteriorating rapidly in Darfur, resulting in the displacement of more than 300,000 people this year, which is more than those displaced during the past two years. He said that violence arose from the rebel movements and tribal conflicts, noting his concern that many provisions of the Doha Document had not been implemented, such as the disarmament of militias and provisions concerning land, justice and compensation. He pointed out that the United States had contacted the Gibril Ibrahim, Abdelwahid and Minni Minnawi factions, and that dialogue should not be limited to Darfur but should include fighters of the revolutionary front, who had begun joining hands with some opposition forces. He added that one should be mindful of the connections between the Darfur movements and the revolutionary front.

22. Divergent views were expressed at the meeting regarding the content of its final statement. The vast majority of participants insisted that the final statement of the meeting abide strictly by the agenda of the meeting, the subject of which was the assassination of Mohamed Bashar. This approach was supported by Chad, Qatar, Egypt, the League of Arab States, OIC, France, Japan, the Russian Federation, the Justice and Equality Movement, the Justice and Liberation Movement and the Government of the Sudan.

23. The statement was adopted by consensus, with Canada disassociating itself, as it did also in the donors conference.

24. Generally all the countries, including Canada, condemned the assassination incident.

25. The most prominent conclusions of the meeting are set out below. The participants:

(a) Condemned the assassination and called for holding the Gibril Ibrahim faction and all perpetrators of violence in Darfur accountable and bringing them to justice;

(b) Condemned the Gibril Ibrahim faction for violating Chadian territory and killing Chadian citizens;

(c) Called for a permanent ceasefire in Darfur as well as a comprehensive and inclusive agreement based on the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

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Letter dated 15 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter dated 15 August 2013 from the representative of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, in advance of the debate of the Security Council on the "Protection of civilians", which is to be held on 19 August 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Christophe **Eick**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

13-42981 (E) 200813

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Annex to the letter dated 15 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour, on behalf of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, to refer to the open debate of the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, to be held on 19 August 2013.

All States have a fundamental obligation to protect their civilians. This is a central pillar of international humanitarian law and human rights law, which has been regularly confirmed by the Security Council. In February 2013, the Security Council noted that "States bear the primary responsibility to protect civilians as well as respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction ..." (S/PRST/2013/2).

For the past 29 months, the Syrian regime has chosen to ignore its basic duty to protect its people and has instead systematically engaged in a campaign of indiscriminate violence against its own population in its attempts to suppress a popular uprising calling for democratic reform. This has caused the displacement and widespread suffering of millions of Syrians, who continue to be vulnerable to regime attacks.

The Syrian regime has repeatedly demonstrated a blatant disregard for civilian life and the laws and customs of war. Contrary to Security Council resolution 1894 (2009), which demands "that parties to armed conflict comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law ...", the Syrian regime has systematically targeted innocent civilians and bombarded densely populated areas with heavy weaponry. These actions represent a direct violation of Syria's international commitments, as also defined by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, their two additional protocols of 1977, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, as well as international human rights law.

The most devastating way in which the Syrian regime has failed to fulfil its obligations to its people has been its persistent denial of humanitarian access to Syria's vulnerable groups. The provision of humanitarian access is critical in situations of armed conflict where civilians are in urgent need of what is often life-saving assistance.

Since April 2011, the Syrian regime has consistently failed to fulfil its international obligations and has instead denied humanitarian access to civilians in towns and villages throughout Syria. In the past year, regime forces have laid siege upon Homs, Aleppo, al-Qusayr, al-Shajarah and Daraa, preventing tens of thousands of civilians from accessing basic necessities, such as drinking water, food and medical care.

The United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has documented these actions, stating that, "Such sieges appear calculated to render living conditions unbearable, forcing civilians to flee and exposing anti-government armed group fighters as military targets" (A/HRC/23/58). Checkpoints controlled by the regime have proliferated, significantly impeding the delivery of cross-line humanitarian aid Moreover, the regime has targeted medical personnel and hospitals, while denying medical access to those in urgent need of care.

The crimes committed by the regime's forces have repeatedly been condemned by the international community. In July 2013, the Security Council itself called upon the Syrian regime "to allow immediate, safe and unhindered access, in accordance with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, for relevant humanitarian, including United Nations, actors, to reach civilians" in places under siege by Syrian forces (SC/11028).

Despite this, the Syrian regime has refused to cooperate to improve humanitarian access and stop the suffering of its people. As Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos informed the Security Council on 16 July 2013, the Syrian regime has repeatedly "rejected" the calls of the Security Council and continues to deny humanitarian organizations regular, consistent and unimpeded access to millions of vulnerable Syrians. It is clear that more must urgently be done to improve the humanitarian situation in Syria.

The Syrian Coalition therefore encourages the consideration of all measures that can improve the protection of civilians as well as enhance humanitarian access and hold actors that violate international law accountable. The Coalition remains firmly committed to abiding by international humanitarian law and stands ready to provide any access throughout the liberated territories of Syria to provide much needed aid to our people.

In anticipation of the upcoming debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Syrian Coalition urges the Security Council to act without delay to improve humanitarian access in Syria, and to authorize the delivery of cross-border humanitarian aid. We also urge the Security Council to increase pressure on the Syrian regime to permit humanitarian operations and give unimpeded access to civilians in need throughout the country, including the free passage of medical supplies.

The Syrian Coalition recognizes that a political solution is needed to end the destruction of Syria and to comprehensively improve the humanitarian situation in Syria. Until such a solution is reached, however, we encourage the Security Council to take all possible measures to help protect and alleviate the suffering of millions of Syrians and to compel the Syrian regime to end its systematic targeting of Syrian civilians.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
United Nations Representative of the Syrian Coalition

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2070 (2012), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) until 15 October 2013, and requested me to report on its implementation semi-annually and not later than 45 days prior to its expiration. The present report covers major developments from the issuance of my report of 8 March 2013 (S/2013/139) to 20 August 2013, and outlines activities undertaken by the Mission in line with its mandate under Security Council resolutions 1542 (2004), 1608 (2005), 1702 (2006), 1743 (2007), 1780 (2007), 1840 (2008), 1892 (2009), 1908 (2010), 1927 (2010), 1944 (2010), 2012 (2011) and 2070 (2012).

II. Political and security update

Political situation

2. During the reporting period, Haiti made strides in establishing a transitional Electoral Council and advancing the Government's "5 E" policy programme (employment, education, environment, energy and rule of law). However, continued delays in the holding of long-overdue elections and strained relations between the executive and legislative branches of government risked undermining progress in the stabilization process.

3. On the occasion of Labour Day on 1 May, the President of Haiti, Michel Joseph Martelly, stressed the importance of national solidarity and institutional strengthening to better prepare the country for foreign investment in support of job creation and socioeconomic development. Throughout the reporting period, President Martelly and Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe visited numerous departments to inaugurate Government programmes and projects implemented in line with the "5 E" policy of the Martelly administration. These projects, many of which are supported by donor funding, range from the construction of roads, schools, clinics and official buildings to support for agricultural production and reforestation.

4. In February 2013, former Presidents René Préval and Jean-Bertrand Aristide appeared in court in response to a summons regarding the case of the April 2000 killing of journalist Jean Léopold Dominique. Former President Jean-Claude

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Duvalier also appeared in court for a separate case. The fact that this did not lead to a breakdown of public order signalled a degree of stability in the political and security situation.

5. However, these gains were mitigated by the limited progress made in the organization of the overdue partial senatorial, municipal and local elections. After several months of protracted negotiations between the three branches of Government, the transitional Electoral Council (Collège transitoire du Conseil Electoral Permanent) was finally established on 19 April. Despite the executive branch's repeated public statements in favour of holding the elections as soon as possible, electoral preparations experienced significant delays. It took Parliament seven months to nominate its three members to the Electoral Council. The Electoral Council submitted the draft electoral law to the executive branch a month late, and the executive branch is yet to submit its revised draft to Parliament. These delays led a number of political and civil society actors to express scepticism about the likelihood that elections would be held in 2013. Partly to allay these concerns, Prime Minister Lamothe announced in late June the establishment of a joint Government-MINUSTAH-United Nations task force to expedite preparations.

6. In this context, several parliamentarians and political party and civil society representatives warned against further delays in holding elections, given the possible expiry of the term of a second third of the Senate in January 2014, as stipulated in the 2008 electoral law. The law specifies that the six-year term of senators elected when it came into effect will expire in 2014 because it was adopted with the expectation that elections would take place in 2008, as opposed to 2009. Many observers have thus argued that, according to the 1987 Constitution and the amended Constitution of 2011, which they consider the supreme law of the land to have precedence over the 2008 electoral law, senators are elected for a full term of six years. This means that the term of this tier of senators elected in 2009 should end in January 2015. Should there be no elections in 2013, and if those arguing in favour of the application of the 2008 electoral law were to prevail, the National Assembly (Senate and Chamber of Deputies) would not be able to function. Accordingly, on 2 July, the Senate voted unanimously to amend the 2008 electoral law to thwart the possibility that the Senate, and by extension the National Assembly, could become dysfunctional after January 2014. Following this motion in the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies announced that it would hold a similar vote, but has not done so to date.

7. Against the backdrop of mounting criticism over the delays in the organization of the elections, the relations between the executive branch and Parliament remained strained. While disagreement continued over the end date of the term of the senators elected in 2009, there was also controversy over allegations of lack of accountability in the Government's management of emergency funds allocated after Hurricane Sandy and allegations that certain Cabinet members hold a foreign citizenship. The resignation of three Cabinet ministers between April and late June fuelled speculation about the possibility of a third Cabinet reshuffle since Laurent Lamothe was sworn in as Prime Minister in May 2012.

8. Meanwhile, the continued presence of MINUSTAH in Haiti has been increasingly called into question by a number of political and civil society stakeholders. On 28 May, the Senate unanimously adopted a non-binding resolution calling for the progressive and orderly withdrawal of MINUSTAH by May 2014. A similar resolution had already been adopted by the Senate in 2011. My Special

Representative met on several occasions with President Martelly and Prime Minister Lamothe to explain the ongoing reduction of the MINUSTAH footprint and the Mission consolidation plan. Both leaders expressed support for a phased withdrawal of the Mission as the capacity of national institutions increased. A joint Government/MINUSTAH working group was established in April to monitor the gradual and orderly transfer of responsibilities to the Government.

Security assessment

9. The overall security situation remained relatively stable throughout the reporting period, with a decrease in both civil unrest and major crimes. Demonstrations did occur, linked mostly to socioeconomic grievances such as food insecurity and lack of basic services. The great majority of these protests were peaceful. After having peaked in October 2012, mostly because of rising food prices, the monthly number of demonstrations from March to June 2013 decreased by almost half, stabilizing at an average of 57 demonstrations per month. The Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (West Department) was most affected by protests.

10. Crime statistics collected by the national police and MINUSTAH showed a steady downward trend in homicides, with a monthly average of 61 homicides from March to June 2013, down from 90 in the same period in 2012. This improvement resulted in part from the frequent successful joint operations conducted by the Haitian National Police and MINUSTAH in the sensitive areas of Port-au-Prince, where approximately 83 per cent of all cases occurred during the reporting period, managing to curb the spike in gang violence witnessed previously. There was also a decrease in the number of kidnappings with a monthly average of nine cases. This is roughly 50 per cent below the monthly average during the previous reporting period and in line with the same period in 2012. The reported average monthly number of rape cases decreased from 45 to 31 during the same period in 2012.

11. A small group of alleged former armed forces elements made a single peaceful appearance in the western outskirts of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area during Flag Day on 18 May 2013. There were, however, reports of local authorities employing, and sometimes supplying with arms, civilian elements for their own personal security or to control areas within their municipalities.

12. The performance of the national police continued to improve as it assumed increased responsibility for the provision of internal security, particularly in the four departments vacated by the MINUSTAH military component (Grand-Anse, Nippes, North-West and South). Nevertheless, MINUSTAH continued to play an important role in maintaining overall security and stability, particularly when robust action was needed to intervene in sensitive areas and in cases of violent civil unrest. In concert with the Haitian National Police, the Mission maintained its military and police presence in violence-prone areas and in some camps for internally displaced persons. From March to June 2013, the military and police components carried out 7,444 joint patrols with the Haitian National Police in Port-au-Prince and its vicinity, and 14,663 joint patrols in the rest of the country.

III. Humanitarian, recovery and economic update

13. Significant strides were made during the reporting period regarding the resettlement of people displaced by the 2010 earthquake. According to the

International Organization for Migration (IOM), between April and June 2013, 33 sites for internally displaced persons were closed and more than 34,000 people were relocated. Return programmes supported by the international community were responsible for 90 per cent of the reduction. As at 30 June 2013, some 279,000 internally displaced persons were living in 352 sites. This brings the total number of displaced persons who left the camps between 2010 and June 2013 to approximately 1,257,502, an overall reduction of 82 per cent.

14. Despite this progress in terms of resettlement, the protection of displaced persons remains a major concern. As humanitarian funding is rapidly decreasing, basic services in water, sanitation and hygiene in camps are declining faster than the number of displaced persons. Furthermore, 74 per cent of the remaining camps are located on private land whose owners are increasingly impatient to reclaim their property. At the end of June, 105 camps were under threat of eviction affecting approximately 75,000 people. Between January and June 2013, 1,177 households were forcefully evicted from four camps, often with police or other Government participation. Despite concerted efforts by the Humanitarian Coordinator and public statements by the Government that legal investigations were under way and protection for internally displaced persons had been increased, no progress on this front has been observed.

15. Significant humanitarian challenges concerning food insecurity continue to plague Haiti. Data provided by the Haitian National Coordination for Food Security revealed that 1.5 million Haitians face a food security and nutrition crisis. Food insecurity is a long-standing problem in Haiti, compounded recently by the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy in 2012, persistent regional droughts, the weak yield of the 2012 winter harvest and increases in food prices. While 700,000 of the 1.5 million people in need of life-saving support received assistance in the first half of 2013, 800,000 people remained unassisted. Predictions for a 2013 hurricane season of above average intensity raise concerns of further destruction not only of crops, but also of livelihoods and assets.

16. In April 2013, the International Monetary Fund assessed the macroeconomic situation in Haiti as stable, while noting continuous deep institutional and structural weaknesses and vulnerability to shocks in the global economy. In June 2013, the estimated growth rate for fiscal year 2012-2013 was lowered to 3.4 per cent, well below the earlier forecast of 6.5 per cent, mainly owing to a weak recovery in agricultural production after last year's hurricane season and droughts. Revenue collection in the first three trimesters of fiscal year 2012-2013 was below the budget targets owing to the weak performance of the tax and customs administrations. Declining international aid has added further urgency to the need to improve revenue collection. Government disbursement has equally failed to reach budgeted targets as a result of weaknesses in the execution rate of public investment.

IV. Activities of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Provision of support to State institutions

17. The rule-of-law indicators project facilitated by MINUSTAH has provided a baseline against which progress can be measured in strengthening key rule-of-law

institutions such as the police, justice and corrections systems. Following a national workshop on the results of the first round of data collection, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security incorporated most of the recommendations on rule-of-law reform into the Ministry action plan for the period 2013-2016. While the plan provides a vision for the development of justice in the country, there remains a need for a broader national justice development plan. Meanwhile, the Global Focal Point team on police, justice and corrections from United Nations Headquarters visited Haiti in April 2013 and, together with MINUSTAH and several United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, developed a country support plan for Haiti. The Mission has also provided inputs to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project on the rule of law (2013-2016) and continues to contribute towards joint implementation of the project, where required. In a related development, the United Nations Rule of Law Working Group coordination mechanism was launched on 6 August 2013 to follow up on the implementation of rule-of-law priorities outlined in the MINUSTAH consolidation plan.

18. Following the replacement by the Administration of nearly all locally elected authorities whose term had expired in 2011 with political appointees, MINUSTAH provided support to the newly appointed interim municipal councils. From 10 to 13 April 2013, MINUSTAH supported the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Communities in organizing 12 nation-wide induction workshops on municipal administration and budgetary procedures. In an effort to promote citizen participation at the communal level, from 3 April to 28 June MINUSTAH facilitated a series of town hall meetings in 124 municipalities. This initiative brought together 8,670 people (including 1,925 women) representing local stakeholders such as local authorities, representatives of political parties, civil society organizations and the media.

19. The Mission continued to provide technical support for the functioning of Parliament and to facilitate the adoption of the country's legislative agenda. On 4 July, Prime Minister Lamothe and the Presidents of both houses of Parliament agreed on a dozen priority bills to be analysed and adopted by Parliament during the second ordinary legislative session, which runs from June to September 2013. However, priority legislation such as the revised electoral law and the law on the functioning of political parties were not included.

20. In line with the programme of the Prime Minister, MINUSTAH helped the Haitian customs authority, under the Ministry of Economy and Finance, to strengthen management and revenue collection capacity at ports of entry. During the reporting period, the Mission provided technical advice on the development and adoption of a strategic plan for the rehabilitation of the Customs Surveillance Directorate.

21. Concerning disaster response preparedness, in May 2013, MINUSTAH, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Civil Protection organized a one-day workshop that was attended by 10 departmental technical coordinators and 10 MINUSTAH humanitarian focal points, in order to draft communal contingency plans to assist the most vulnerable municipalities. In addition, MINUSTAH constructed the national civil protection emergency call centre and the West Department emergency operation centre in Port-au-Prince, which accommodates approximately 50 civil protection staff.

Support for the political process

22. My Special Representative engaged intensively with Haiti's political decision makers to advocate for progress on the launch of the electoral process and the elaboration of a consensual legislative agenda for 2013. Concerning the elections, my Special Representative has made a number of proposals to President Martelly and the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on how to promote dialogue and ensure the adoption and promulgation of the electoral law. MINUSTAH also closely cooperated with Haiti's international partners, including the diplomatic corps in Port-au-Prince, in order to create momentum around the key priorities of the Government.

Support for the forthcoming elections

23. Upon the establishment of the transitional Electoral Council on 19 April, the newly appointed electoral councillors focused on the amendment of the 2008 electoral law with support from MINUSTAH. On 1 July, the Electoral Council forwarded that document to the executive branch. While the electoral law is yet to be submitted by the executive branch to Parliament, MINUSTAH has provided technical advice to the parliamentary bicameral commission on the electoral law and lobbied for the inclusion of the constitutional minimum 30 per cent female participation quota in the law. In April 2013, UNDP, in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and MINUSTAH, organized a training session on gender and elections for 52 Electoral Council participants, while MINUSTAH supported the Council in drafting a new voter sensitization plan and provided planning assistance to the Director-General of the Council. MINUSTAH also provided logistical support to the National Identification Office and its mobile teams in order to register new voters and distribute national identification cards. UNDP continues to provide technical support to Electoral Council staff on the improvement of the electoral list, including with regard to the transmission of electoral tally sheets. Out of the $34 million provisional electoral budget managed by UNDP, $31.5 million has been pledged, including HTG 600 million (approximately $14 million) by the Government of Haiti, leaving a gap of only $2.4 million.

Military

24. During the reporting period, the military component of MINUSTAH continued to fulfil its primary mission of maintaining a secure and stable environment, in addition to enabling the delivery of humanitarian assistance and preparing for disaster response. Several security operations were conducted in accordance with the established procedure, whereby operations are led by the national police with support from the MINUSTAH police and military components and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre. These operations focused on disrupting gang and criminal activity, mainly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (West Department).

25. In addition to providing extensive engineering support to the Mission, MINUSTAH military engineering companies continued to engage on a wide range of Government priorities aimed at the improvement of living and security conditions for the population, which included road repair, well drilling, drainage and canal cleaning, water distribution and the erection of pre-fabricated units.

26. The security impact of the withdrawal of the MINUSTAH military component from four lower security risk departments appears to be minimal, although the situation could change with the onset of the forthcoming electoral period. Demonstrations caused by socioeconomic grievances have been mostly peaceful. According to the Mission threat assessment, illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings are the main law enforcement concerns. Plans are in place to air-lift quick-reaction forces, should an urgent need arise to reinforce the national police or the Mission police component in these four departments.

Police

27. Following the adoption of the 2012-2016 national police development plan in August 2012, MINUSTAH, with support from the United Nations country team, has worked with the Haitian National Police on the adoption of a joint implementation plan. The plan will refocus MINUSTAH support to police development efforts through a renewed strategy to co-locate United Nations police officers with the Haitian National Police, in accordance with a co-location directive signed by the General Director of the Haitian National Police and the MINUSTAH Police Commissioner. The plan will also include an assessment programme to jointly monitor progress in the implementation of the national police development plan with the newly created Haitian National Police strategic planning unit.

28. During the reporting period, the national police achieved significant results in fighting crime, most notably by arresting 42 suspected kidnappers. This improvement in performance is partly attributable to the support provided by MINUSTAH forces in the prevention of violence and crime and efforts to combat violence and crime, including through co-location, enhanced sharing of information and increased joint operations.

29. In order to achieve the objective of a minimum of 15,000 active police officers by 2016, the twenty-fourth promotion started classes on 1 April 2013, with 1,102 cadets (including 116 women) who will graduate from the police school in November 2013. This new promotion will augment the number of active police officers to approximately 11,200. The first steps of the recruitment plan for the twenty-fifth promotion have already been taken to ensure a swift transition between the two promotions. Meanwhile, 42 senior officers, including 5 women, began a six-month police commissioner training programme at the national police academy on 15 April 2013. A second group is expected to commence similar training starting in November 2013. Notwithstanding the important contributions by bilateral partners to police development, funding is still insufficient for all targets of the plan to be achieved. There is a lack of qualified MINUSTAH police and civilian expertise to support the technical advisory services required for the development of the Haitian National Police in the areas of personnel, budget and finance, procurement and supply, legal affairs, logistics management, monitoring and evaluation, project management, registry and archives, forensics and information technology. To overcome this shortfall, all efforts should be made to ensure that international officers deployed have the requisite profiles and specialized skill sets. Where specialized police personnel cannot be provided by police-contributing countries, or where continuity is particularly important, civilian personnel should be recruited through the normal recruitment process or seconded by Member States. The generous assistance of the international community will remain critical to enabling the national police to meet major benchmarks by 2016.

30. Joint vetting activities by the national police and MINUSTAH aimed at completing the certification of police officers continued nationwide. To date, 4,736 cases have been fully reviewed, resulting in the certification of 4,606 officers, while 130 were not recommended. Among the latter, 79 officers were notified of their dismissal during the previous reporting period and continued to exercise their right of appeal. Vetting continued for the remaining national police personnel, with 2,770 ongoing cases and 5,410 cases that have yet to be reviewed. In an effort to complete the background checks of new cadets before they graduate in line with the provisions of the development plan, discussions are ongoing concerning the creation of a new candidate vetting unit within the Inspectorate General.

31. In an effort to improve the oversight capacity of the Inspectorate General within the national police, a strategic plan for capacity-building was developed that aims to overcome current challenges impairing the independence and effectiveness of the oversight body, including weak staffing, a shortage of equipment, insufficient specialized training and limited financial resources.

Protection of vulnerable groups

32. The MINUSTAH military and police components maintained their presence in camps for the internally displaced and in fragile, urban communities prone to crime where women and children are vulnerable to sexual and gender-based violence. The Haitian National Police, with the support of MINUSTAH, has carried out a series of community-oriented policing programmes to improve the protection of the population and to foster public trust in the national police. Of the remaining 352 sites for internally displaced persons, three high-risk camps have been secured by a 24-hour MINUSTAH security presence (Jean-Marie-Vincent, Pétion-Ville Club and Carradeux) and 24 additional camps through daily patrols. The remaining sites were subject to random patrols. During the reporting period, the military and police components conducted 7,952 patrols in camps for internally displaced persons in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

Community violence reduction

33. Under its programme to reduce community violence, MINUSTAH continued to conduct stabilization initiatives in fragile urban communities, addressing high youth unemployment, weak security institutions and criminal gang activities. The Mission tackled those issues by supporting large-scale, labour-intensive environmental projects, professional skills training and income-generating activities to provide former gang members, at-risk young people and vulnerable groups with socioeconomic alternatives to crime and violence. The Mission completed 57 projects under the 2011-2012 budget and initiated 48 new projects, valued at $8 million, under the 2012-2013 budget. The latter include 23 labour-intensive projects focusing on watershed management, city infrastructure and canal rehabilitation that provide temporary employment to an estimated 20,000 young people. During the reporting period, professional training and income-generating projects reached 1,600 beneficiaries. Furthermore, in partnership with the national authorities and civil society organizations, MINUSTAH conducted 90 anti-violence sensitization sessions in historically violent neighbourhoods, reaching over 32,500 people. The Community Violence Reduction programme is concentrating its range of projects to further assist in the Mission's increased focus on the rule of law in the more challenging and fragile areas of the country.

Justice

34. During the reporting period, the Superior Council of the Judiciary took steps to consolidate its authority over the judiciary in an effort to significantly reduce political interference in judicial affairs. In particular, with support from MINUSTAH, the Superior Council has begun to take an active interest in the vetting of judges before they are appointed; has taken steps to operationalize parts of its administrative structures; and has issued circulars requiring courts to report regularly on the number of cases decided and the causes of pretrial detention, as well as to bring judges of the peace — the lowest level of the judiciary — under the authority of the courts, as opposed to under the prosecutors (who report to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security). Nevertheless, there continue to be reports concerning the appointment of judges of the peace without following legal requirements.

35. MINUSTAH has supported and participated in a working group developing a revised criminal code and criminal procedure code. Drafts of both codes have been approved by the Council of Government and are awaiting approval of the Council of Ministers before being submitted to Parliament, where it is expected that further revisions will be made before the codes are adopted.

Corrections

36. MINUSTAH provided technical support to the prison administration to develop the national strategic development plan for prisons (2013-2016). MINUSTAH capacity-building support has continued to improve the prison registrar system by ensuring that each detainee is registered, thus enabling swifter identification of irregular detention cases for release by the judicial authorities.

37. MINUSTAH has supported the prison administration in building partnerships with local hospitals and national and international non-governmental organizations to improve prison health services. These efforts, combined with the mentoring and training of prison medical staff through the co-location of MINUSTAH Government-provided personnel, have contributed to reducing the inmate death rate (from 1.32 to 0.49 per cent) and controlling the spread of cholera and tuberculosis. In close collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, MINUSTAH continues to support four legal aid offices in Port-au-Prince that have so far processed 5,000 cases. These offices provide legal representation to arrested individuals and inmates at the time of the court hearing. As a result, a significant number of arrestees have not entered into the prison system and cases pending for a long period of time have been resolved. As a result of MINUSTAH advocacy work, since March 2013, 550 prisoners in illegal pretrial detention have been released. Despite this progress, many detainees still lack legal documentation related to their court cases.

Human rights

38. The Mission continued to monitor and report on the human rights situation in Haiti and assist the Haitian authorities and civil society through capacity-building activities. The issuance on 13 May of a decree establishing the interministerial commission on human rights was one of the most notable developments during the reporting period. The commission could contribute significantly to Haiti's ratification of and compliance with international human rights treaties. It could also accelerate the implementation of the recommendations accepted by Haiti in the

context of the universal periodic review. Notwithstanding this progress, key challenges and systemic deficiencies remain, in particular with regard to the excessive use of force by the national police and the related insufficient treatment of reported cases by the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police. Other issues of concern include forced evictions from camps for internally displaced persons; prison overcrowding; child slavery; extended periods of pretrial detention; the hiring of civilians to perform police duties; and the statelessness of persons of Haitian descent arriving in Haiti without any civil status documentation. The efforts of an interministerial group working on this matter are a fundamental contribution to addressing the myriad of issues related to statelessness prevalent in Haiti. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has provided awareness-raising activities and will extend technical assistance to ensure compliance with international legal standards.

39. In a positive development, several cases concerning past serious human rights violations have been initiated or revived. MINUSTAH took note of the hearings in the appellate court in the case against former President Jean-Claude Duvalier and the summoning of former Presidents René Préval and Jean-Bertrand Aristide as witnesses in the investigation of the case concerning the murder of journalist Jean Léopold Dominique in 2000. Despite these advances, MINUSTAH continued to document cases that raise doubts about the independence of the judiciary and demonstrate the persistence of impunity in Haiti. In the case concerning the April 2012 murder of police officer Walky Calixte, a parliamentary commission was mandated to examine the request of the investigating judge to lift the immunity of two parliamentarians allegedly involved in the case. On 18 June, the commission recommended that the Chamber of Deputies refrain from lifting the immunity. The final decision of the Chamber of Deputies on this matter was still pending at the end of the reporting period.

Gender

40. Sexual and gender-based violence remains a concern. The Mission has noted an apparent lack of diligence on behalf of police and judicial authorities in treating such cases, leading to a high degree of impunity. To address this situation, the MINUSTAH police component has worked closely with United Nations agencies such as UNHCR and the United Nations Population Fund to support survivors of gender-based violence. The MINUSTAH police component has also participated in a sensitization programme to train national police officers to prevent and respond to allegations of sexual and gender-based violence. MINUSTAH has trained 39 national police trainers, who in turn have trained 737 national police officers in the field. The curriculum has also been integrated into the basic training provided at the police school in Port-au-Prince.

41. MINUSTAH provided technical and financial support for the organization of an advocacy workshop by the Chamber of Deputies to promote the participation of women in public life, in line with the amended Constitution. The process led to the drafting and submission of joint proposals to the Electoral Council on the integration of the Constitution's minimum quota of 30 per cent representation of women in the electoral law. It also resulted in the establishment of a multi-sectoral technical committee on the promotion of women's political participation.

Child protection

42. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH received reports of 261 incidents against minors, including 173 cases related to sexual violence (138 cases of rape, 15 cases of gang rape, 5 cases of attempted rape, 2 cases of child prostitution and 13 cases of sexual assault); 7 cases of homicide; 16 cases of kidnapping; 4 cases of use of children by armed gangs; 22 cases of physical assault; 7 cases of trafficking of children; and 32 cases of domestic mistreatment. The reports were shared weekly with the national police and the Brigade for the Protection of Minors for follow-up. In its effort to reinforce the national child protection system, MINUSTAH supported the training, funded by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), of 10 police trainers from the national police on child rights and child protection who will carry out all child protection-related activities at the National Police Academy. In order to improve the legal framework governing child protection, MINUSTAH, UNICEF and IOM are closely working with national stakeholders to advocate for the adoption by Parliament of the law on human trafficking, as well as the law on the adoption of children, endorsed by the Senate in May 2013.

HIV/AIDS

43. Eleven United Nations agencies formed a joint team to work on four strategic areas of the national AIDS programme. New estimates published by the Ministry of Public Health and Population in March 2013 show that new HIV infections among young persons between the ages of 15 and 24 had fallen by 21 per cent during the period 2011-2013. Concerning mother-to-child transmission, new infections fell by 51 per cent during the period 2011-2012. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH contributed to a sensitization campaign during an HIV-testing promotion day, resulting in nearly 1,000 people being tested for HIV.

Quick-impact projects

44. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH fully allocated the 2012-2013 budget of $5 million for 138 quick-impact projects. These projects were funded in accordance with the Mission's established priorities, in partnership with Haitian authorities and civil society. They included: measures to contain the cholera epidemic and preventing other water-borne diseases (38 projects); enhancement of safety and security in impoverished and insecure areas through the installation of public solar lighting (18 projects); support to rule-of-law institutions and good governance (44 projects); and rehabilitation of other public infrastructure and services (30 projects). The remaining eight projects were implemented in the areas of agriculture and environmental protection.

Conduct and discipline

45. The Conduct and Discipline Unit continued to implement the integrated strategy to prevent misconduct through training sessions for 1,074 MINUSTAH personnel. Specific training of trainers on the prevention of misconduct, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse, was also delivered to military and police commanders and focal points. The Mission leadership consistently delivered a strong message to all staff members to maintain the highest standards of conduct at all times, both inside and outside the Mission area, while on duty and off duty.

Public information and outreach

46. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH used public information as a strategic tool in order to support the implementation of its mandate. Public information efforts continued through international and national media relations and regular press conferences, in addition to timely issuance of press releases and other products, including the Mission radio, the newly upgraded website, live streaming, social media and television products. The Mission used its media output for outreach on cholera prevention and disaster and hurricane season preparedness and its work to strengthen the national police and rule-of-law institutions. MINUSTAH aimed much of its public information efforts at young persons living in disenfranchised areas of Port-au-Prince and the regions. In this regard, the Mission launched a nationwide anti-violence campaign related to citizen participation, non-violence and human rights, including measures to increase the participation of women and persons living with disabilities into public life and in the forthcoming electoral process.

V. Humanitarian, recovery and development activities

Coordination between the Mission and the United Nations country team

47. The United Nations country team continued to increase joint programming in alignment with the Government-endorsed United Nations integrated strategic framework. Of the current seven joint programmes, two are funded by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) through the United Nations multi-partner trust fund. As at 30 June 2013, the overall disbursement rate of United Nations HRF-funded projects was 77.5 per cent.

48. Following the launch of Haiti's aid coordination framework during the previous reporting period, the Government, with United Nations support, held the first international meeting of the Committee on Aid Effectiveness in May 2013. At that high-level meeting, the Government and its partners committed to a series of measures to foster greater alignment of international assistance with national priorities, increase transparency and strengthen mutual accountability. The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation is currently implementing a short-term road map to support the effective functioning of sectoral and thematic coordination tables with the participation of the national authorities, the donor community and civil society.

49. Following a mission to Haiti in April 2013, the Political Champions for Disaster Resilience group invited the Prime Minister to become a member of the group and attend their next meeting in September 2013. The Political Champions group aims to mobilize increased attention and resources in favour of disaster resilience in at-risk countries such as Haiti, and consists of senior representatives of leading international and national institutions, including the Caribbean Community, UNDP, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UNICEF, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank and the European Commission.

United Nations ongoing efforts to eliminate the cholera epidemic

50. According to the Ministry of Public Health and Population, as at 29 June 2013, the cholera epidemic had caused the deaths of 8,173 persons and infected 664,282, with 258 deaths and 28,800 infections in the first six months of 2013. The Pan American Health Organization has forecast 118,000 infections in 2013, up from 101,000 in 2012. In June 2013, the nation-wide case fatality rate stood at 1.18 per cent, down from a high of 2.4 per cent in November 2010. The United Nations has continued to support the Government efforts to prevent and treat the disease in line with the initiative of the Secretary-General to support the national plan for the elimination of cholera, launched in February 2013. The World Health Organization/ Pan American Health Organization and UNICEF have worked with the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the Department for Water and Hygiene and partners to ensure an adequate response to all cholera outbreaks. The United Nations also trained health staff and rehabilitated and built health and water and sanitation infrastructure, including hospitals, cholera treatment centres, water points, wells and oral rehydration points in internally displaced persons camps and other at-risk locations. A cholera vaccination campaign, with vaccines provided by UNICEF, managed by the Ministry of Public Health and Population, was carried out to immunize approximately 112,000 people in the highest risk areas.

51. The budget of the national plan for the elimination of cholera amounts to $443.7 million for the period 2013-2015. UNICEF, following a request of the Government of Haiti, is in the process of setting up a national fund that will allow for the disbursement of cholera funds. The Regional Coalition for Water and Sanitation to Eliminate Cholera in the Island of Hispaniola, with the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Community-based Medicine and Lessons from Haiti, convened a donor meeting in Washington, D.C. on 31 May, where more than $29.1 million was pledged, bringing total pledges in support of the national plan to $209.4 million. Yet, the most urgent needs for the forthcoming hurricane season remain underfunded. The cholera portion of the 2013 humanitarian action plan, which directly supports the national plan, has received only $11.2 million of the $40 million requirement, including pledges of $1.5 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund and $1 million from UNDP for immediate cholera response. Since 2012, the number of humanitarian organizations engaged in cholera response has decreased by more than half, as have medical stocks required to treat the projected caseload in the remainder of 2013.

VI. Update on the drawdown and reconfiguration of the Mission

52. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2070 (2012), the military and police components completed the mandated reduction of their personnel during the reporting period. By 30 June 2013, a total of 1,070 military personnel had been withdrawn, resulting in a total authorized strength of 6,270 troops. Likewise, the number of MINUSTAH police has been reduced by 640 to an authorized strength of 2,601 officers, including 50 correction officers.

53. The Mission's consolidation has led to the further reconfiguration of the military component into five security hubs and to the reduction of the Mission Support component to four support offices. Formed police units have been redeployed to ensure maximum coverage and prevent the occurrence of security

vacuums. The ongoing reconfiguration of MINUSTAH has also resulted in the downscaling of 10 regional headquarters to 5 regional offices and 5 smaller departmental offices, with a view to further consolidating the latter in fiscal year 2015-2016.

54. As the national police training programme is proceeding according to plan and the security situation has shown signs of progressive improvement, in line with the consolidation plan 2013-2016 for MINUSTAH included in the annex to my report to the Security Council of 8 March 2013 (S/2013/139), I recommend that the Security Council consider a further reduction of the Mission authorized military strength from 6,270 to 5,021 through a balanced withdrawal of 1,249 infantry and engineering personnel by June 2014. This 15 per cent reduction in the Mission uniformed strength would coincide with current troop rotation schedules and may also take into account the possible holding of long-awaited elections.

VII. Financial implications

55. By its resolution 67/275 of 28 June 2013, the General Assembly appropriated the amount of $609,187,500 for the maintenance of MINUSTAH for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of MINUSTAH beyond 15 October 2013, the cost of maintaining the Mission would be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly. As at 2 August 2013, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSTAH amounted to $226.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $4,109.2 million. As at 2 August 2013, amounts owed to troop- and formed police contributors to MINUSTAH totalled $17.8 million. Reimbursements of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the period up to 30 April 2013 and 31 December 2012, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

VIII. Observations

56. The steps taken by the Martelly administration to project a new image of Haiti abroad in a bid to attract foreign investments are indicators of a genuine desire to move forward with socioeconomic development. The Government's efforts have resulted in a significant increase in economic partnerships and have also generated renewed hope concerning Haiti's ability to achieve development and growth. These efforts are commendable and must be sustained, especially since Haiti's economic growth has not been as robust as initially forecast during the past two years.

57. Likewise, President Martelly's assumption of the six-month rotating chairmanship of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) during 2013 has opened a new chapter in Haiti's engagement with the broader region. Haiti's commitment to regional cooperation through CARICOM in matters of security, financial reform and economic growth could result in tangible benefits in terms of stability and development for the Haitian people, the majority of whom continue to face unemployment and poverty.

58. Nevertheless, the democratic process in Haiti remains vulnerable to setbacks linked to political instability and infighting between the branches of government. I am deeply concerned about the continued delay in the holding of the partial senatorial, municipal and local elections, which stems in part from the protracted negotiations between the executive branch and Parliament on the establishment of the Electoral Council and the adoption and promulgation of the electoral law. I urge the political leaders of Haiti to engage in a constructive dialogue to reach a minimum political consensus on the holding of the elections as soon as possible, particularly as the next set of elections is due in late 2014, for another tier of the Senate and for the Chamber of Deputies.

59. Such an agreement is of paramount importance to avert the negative impact on democratic governance of an institutional vacuum following the end of term of 10 senators in May 2012, and the possible expiry of the terms of a second tier of senators in January 2014. If senatorial elections are not held by then, the resulting possible dissolution of the Senate, and by extension of the National Assembly, would constitute a significant setback to the democratic process, which Haiti cannot afford. A minimum consensus should also include agreement on an agenda of key legislative priorities aimed at promoting institution-building, safeguarding investment, protecting human rights and putting an end to the prevailing culture of impunity. My Special Representative has been actively promoting political dialogue among Haiti's political stakeholders and will continue to do so.

60. In the meantime, it is vital that the Government continue to work on multiple fronts to make progress towards meeting the stabilization benchmarks jointly agreed with MINUSTAH, which are outlined in my previous report to the Security Council (S/2013/139). The establishment of an Electoral Council, a task force on the elections and the Government pledge to contribute nearly half of the electoral budget are welcome. Adequate funding should be allocated from the national budget to cover the operational costs of the Electoral Council in order to build the management, the administrative and the logistical capabilities of the electoral body. As before, the United Nations stands ready to support the electoral process.

61. The strengthening of the national police is another key stabilization benchmark. The continued commitment of the Government and Member States is required to ensure that the appropriate funding is made available to support a professional, reliable and accountable police force. I welcome the reinvigorated recruitment and training programme of the national police, which is a key prerequisite to meet the target of 15,000 active officers by 2016. In order to ensure the continued and sustainable growth of the national police, including an increased presence in the regions, I encourage the Government to address with greater focus the growing budgetary needs of the institution and the need to strengthen its administrative and management capacity. I urge the senior leadership of the national police, with MINUSTAH support, to spare no effort in strengthening the Inspectorate General to ensure the accountability and the internal discipline of the institution.

62. I encourage the Government to continue to strengthen the country's rule-of-law institutions, which provide the safeguards required to attract investment and promote economic partnerships and development. Although the oversight and accountability mechanisms provided for in the Constitution have been established, it is critical that the Government and its international partners continue to build the

capacity of those institutions and put an end to the pervasive culture of impunity that continues to hinder progress in Haiti. To that end, it is critical that key rule-of-law institutions, such as the national police, the Superior Council of the Judiciary and the Anti-Corruption Unit, be allowed to operate independently. Following the expiration, on 18 July, of the term of the Superior Court of Auditors and Administrative Disputes, I urge the swift nomination of new members to this vital oversight body.

63. In addition to the need for greater political stability and institutional integrity and development, it is critically important for Haiti and the international community to redouble efforts to improve the current humanitarian situation, in particular regarding the ongoing cholera epidemic. Eradicating cholera in Haiti is a complex and challenging task requiring a long-term commitment on the part of Haiti and international donors. I therefore call on Member States to ensure that the funds and expertise required for this long-term development effort are provided.

64. While challenges remain, the progress made in the stabilization of Haiti since the initial deployment of MINUSTAH in 2004 has been considerable. Given recent achievements and the evolution of the challenges facing Haiti, the ongoing reconfiguration of MINUSTAH should continue. Nine years after its initial deployment, it is worth examining whether a large multidimensional peacekeeping operation is still the most appropriate form of international support to Haiti. I intend to engage with the Government of Haiti and Member States to explore the best way for the United Nations to continue contributing to greater stability and development in the country. In doing so, the option of replacing MINUSTAH with a smaller, more focused assistance Mission by 2016 will be explored and proposals on the way forward will be included in my next report to the Security Council in March 2014. In the meantime, reiterating my intention to continue to consolidate the presence of the Mission, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Mission for an additional year, until 15 October 2014.

65. In conclusion, I would like to thank my outgoing Acting Special Representative, Nigel Fisher, for his service in support of Haiti. I also wish to welcome my new Special Representative, Sandra Honoré, who has assumed responsibility for the Mission during this crucial period in the national stabilization process and at a time when the Mission is undergoing reconfiguration. Lastly, I should like to thank the men and women of MINUSTAH, troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries, the United Nations country team and key partners for their continued dedication and commitment to stability and development in Haiti.

Annex I

Progress in the consolidation plan 2013-2016 for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

1. In my previous report to the Security Council (S/2013/139), I outlined the MINUSTAH consolidation plan. I noted that the plan was developed in consultation with the Government and international partners and in collaboration with the United Nations country team. My Special Representative consulted with several troop-contributing countries who expressed their support for the consolidation plan and their commitment to the process of stabilization, democratic consolidation and strengthening of the rule of law in Haiti. While the Mission will continue to assist the Government with the maintenance of security and political stability, the plan identifies four stabilization benchmarks that constitute the framework of the operationalization of the consolidation of the Mission.

2. The present annex provides an update on progress made during the reporting period towards the achievement of the four stabilization benchmarks: development of the Haitian police capacity; building of Haitian electoral capacity; rule of law and human rights; and progress on key governance issues.

Core objectives

Police development

3. MINUSTAH focused its support to augment Haitian national police capacity in line with the 2012-2016 development plan as follows:

- The twenty-fourth promotion comprising 1,102 cadets (including 116 women) began in April 2013 and is scheduled to be completed by November 2013; preparations for the twenty-fifth promotion are under way
- 52 infrastructure projects to improve police facilities have been financed by the Government and its international partners; 17 projects have been completed, 21 are under way; and 14 are to be launched
- Development of a database to track and manage institutional assets is ongoing
- The Government completed the procurement process for new weapons for all national police officers in April 2013; MINUSTAH is helping to register each pistol in a database
- The 2013-2016 strategic plan for capacity-building of the judicial police directorate has been drafted and is pending final approval .
- In November 2013, graduation of the twenty-fourth promotion will provide personnel for an increase in the geographic coverage of the national police.

Electoral capacity-building

4. The Mission objective is to create the conditions that will allow the Government of Haiti to assume full responsibility for the electoral process following the next presidential elections, which are due in 2015. To that end, the following actions have been taken:

- A transitional Electoral Council was established on 19 April 2013
- On 24 June 2013, the Prime Minister established a governmental task force with representatives from the Electoral Council, MINUSTAH, UNDP and various ministries involved in the electoral process, in order to accelerate preparations for the elections
- The Electoral Council Director General and councillors are working on general electoral planning and the electoral calendar
- The Government of Haiti has committed HTG 600 million (approximately $14 million) to the $34 million provisional electoral budget; HTG 300 million (approximately $7 million) has been deposited into the UNDP Basket Fund
- The Electoral Council drafted and submitted on 1 July to the executive branch a new electoral law including amendments that, if adopted, could reduce the cost of elections.

Rule of law and human rights

5. MINUSTAH is focusing its activities on supporting the Government in its efforts to strengthen rule-of-law accountability and oversight mechanisms and to advance crucial legislative reform. Following are examples of such activities:

- 4,736 Haitian National Police vetting cases have been completed; 4,606 officers have been certified, while 130 were not recommended; vetting continues for the remaining national police personnel
- The inter-ministerial commission on human rights was established on 13 May
- The Office of the Ombudsperson has become increasingly operational, with funding allocated in the national budget and with at least one staff member deployed to each department
- Limited progress in the operational capacity of the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police with 19 new cases of human rights violations committed by police officers submitted.

Key governance issues

6. The Mission objective is to promote dialogue on a minimum political consensus regarding elections and the legislative agenda and support the strengthening of State institutions at the central and local levels. To that end, the following actions have been taken:

- 140 municipal 2013-2014 budgets have been completed
- Town hall meetings have been held in 124 municipalities to promote citizen participation at the communal level
- National stakeholders have engaged in discussions for a constitutional reform project to reduce excessive frequency of elections under the amended Constitution of 1987.

Annex II

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing military staff and contingents (personnel on the ground as at 31 July 2013)

Country	Staff officers		Troops		Total
	Females	Males	Females	Males	
Argentina		11	38	523	572
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)		3	18	187	208
Brazil		18	16	1 369[a]	1 403[b]
Canada		4		34	38
Chile		3	29	432	464
Ecuador		1	1	65	67
France	1	2			3
Guatemala		5	13	119	137
Indonesia		2		167	169
Jordan		10		242	252
Nepal		13	10	340	363
Paraguay		3	6	154	163
Peru		8	9	357	374
Philippines		2	6	150	158
Republic of Korea		2			2
Sri Lanka		13		850	863
United States of America	2	7			9
Uruguay		10	40	903	953
Total	**3**	**117**	**186**	**5 892**	**6 198**

[a] Including one Bolivian attached to the Brazilian contingent.
[b] The Force Commander is employed on a United Nations contract and hence is not reflected in the troop strength.

Annex III

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: composition and strength of the police (personnel on the ground as at 31 July 2013)

	Number of United Nations police		*Number of formed police units*	
Country	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*
Argentina	1	12	–	–
Bangladesh	–	3	106	213
Benin	1	41	–	–
Brazil	2	3	–	–
Burkina Faso	21	32	–	–
Burundi	8	32	–	–
Cameroon	4	33	–	–
Canada	9	78	–	–
Central African Republic	–	3	–	–
Chad	–	3	–	–
Chile	3	11	–	–
China	–	–	–	–
Colombia	2	19	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	6	117	–	–
Croatia	–	3	–	–
Egypt	–	23	–	–
El Salvador	1	6	–	–
France	2	28	–	–
Grenada	–	–	–	–
Guinea	–	19	–	–
India	–	–	–	438
Indonesia	–	4	–	–
Jamaica	–	–	–	–
Jordan	–	21	–	320
Kyrgyzstan	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	–	–	–	–
Madagascar	–	–	–	–
Mali	2	39	–	–
Nepal	1	4	13	127
Niger	12	56	–	–
Nigeria	1	–	–	–
Norway	4	2	–	–
Pakistan	–	7	–	140
Philippines	3	17	–	–

Country	Number of United Nations police		Number of formed police units	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Romania	3	15	–	–
Russian Federation	1	4	–	–
Rwanda	7	13	14	126
Senegal	2	9	7	132
Serbia	–	5	–	–
Sierra Leone	–	–	–	–
Spain	1	7	–	–
Sri Lanka	2	11	–	–
Sweden	–	–	–	–
Togo	–	2	–	–
Tunisia	1	13	–	–
Turkey	–	17	–	–
United States of America	7	38	–	–
Uruguay	–	4	–	–
Yemen	–	25	–	–
	107	779	140	1 496
Subtotal	**886**		**1 636**	
Total	**2 522**			

MINUSTAH map as at July 2013



Map No. 4224 Rev. 57 UNITED NATIONS
July 2013

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations A/67/963–S/2013/494

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
20 August 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 43
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 9 August 2013, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit Çevik
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-43294 (E) 210813

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 18 July 2013, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/67/940-S/2013/435), which yet again contains false claims of "infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey" and "the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships". In a manner stepping up its belligerent and provocative rhetoric at a time when the full-fledged negotiations for a comprehensive settlement are expected to resume between the two leaders in October, the said letter of the Greek Cypriot representative also included, for the first time, false allegations as regards the Ercan airport in the North.

In response to such pretentious allegations, I wish once again to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. It must be stated that assertions of so-called violations of air traffic regulations are unfounded, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. Similarly, the claim raised in the said letter in relation to Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given that the Greek Cypriot Administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This constitutes yet another attempt aimed at distorting the facts and the realities of the island.

As noted in our previous letters, such allegations are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot Administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As for the false claims regarding the Ercan airport in the North, it should be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing successful and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island in line with its isolation policy imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people.

Since then, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and consent of its Civil Aviation Department, over which the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety reflects all International Civil Aviation Organization standards and recommendations, providing safe, regular and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport, as well as using the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made

to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in keeping with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is constantly working in close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In fact, each year more than 19,000 flights take place to and from Ercan airport, serving over 2 million passengers, including Greek Cypriots, and each day approximately 600 aircraft pass through the Ercan advisory airspace. In 2012 alone, 2,777,000 passengers used the Ercan airport. It is predicted that this number will be about 3,000,000 in 2013.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false statements, to confer legitimacy on the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile, since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed contribute to a better atmosphere on the island would be for the Greek Cypriot side to stop misappropriating for itself the rights and responsibilities that it does not legally have and to cease its hostile and derogatory acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot Administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the north of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue its well-known propaganda tactics, which are clearly not conducive to a positive atmosphere on the eve of the resumption, under your good offices mission, of the full-fledged negotiations between the two leaders for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. As the Turkish Cypriot side, on the other hand, we are committed to continuing to uphold our constructive and positive stance and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2013/495

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 August 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2111 (2013), adopted by the Council on 24 July 2013. In paragraph 27 of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to re-establish the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, consisting of eight experts, for a period of 16 months, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolutions 2060 (2012), 2002 (2011), and 1916 (2010), and consistent with resolution 1907 (2009), in order to fulfil its mandate.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, I have appointed the following experts:

Somalia

Ms. Déirdre Clancy, Ireland (humanitarian expert)

Mr. Dinesh Mahtani, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (finance expert)

Mr. Jörg Roofthooft, Belgium (transport/maritime expert)

Mr. Babatunde Taiwo, Nigeria (arms expert)

Eritrea

Mr. Nicholas Argeros, United States of America (finance expert)

Ms. Zeina Awad, Lebanon (transport expert)

Mr. Cornelis Steenken, Netherlands (arms expert)

I have also designated Mr. Jarat Chopra, Canada (regional expert), to serve as Coordinator of the Monitoring Group.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

13-43127 (E) 190813

Please recycle

United Nations A/67/964–S/2013/496

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 15 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in connection with the letter dated 24 July 2013 (A/67/943-S/2013/442) regarding the practice of banning foreign nationals from visiting Azerbaijan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-43276 (E) 260813

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 15 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

Authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic have on numerous occasions expressed their grave concern over the fraudulent campaign by Azerbaijan aimed at distorting the essence of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh and misleading the international community. This campaign expands from year to year, introducing new sophisticated methods of falsifications, provocations and revanchist threats.

The most recent examples of such propaganda campaign are the circulation of the 24 July 2013 letter (A/67/943-S/2013/442) in the United Nations, calling upon the Member States to warn their citizens against visiting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic "without the prior authorization of the Government of Azerbaijan", as well as publication of a list of people declared *personae non gratae* by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan because of their visits to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The list of 335 individuals from 41 countries includes members of parliament, prominent public figures, culture and art professionals, journalists, students and tourists.

In this respect, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic deems appropriate to state the following:

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is an independent state with a population that should not be deprived of the possibility of exercising its fundamental human rights under any circumstances, as enshrined in article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty".

People of Nagorno Karabakh established their state exercising their inalienable right to self-determination in full compliance with the norms and principles of international law and acting upon the then effective constitutional and legal framework of the Soviet Union. Since the very first day of its establishment, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, unlike Azerbaijan, has assumed the course of building a democratic State, ensuring all the rights and freedoms for its citizens. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic leadership intends to continue the policy of comprehensive development of the Republic and its democratic institutions, and has repeatedly expressed its readiness for mutually beneficial cooperation with all interested parties.

From the very beginning, Azerbaijan rejected any possibility of a civilized dialogue with Nagorno Karabakh and adhered to the policy of settling the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh through the application of brutal, unproportional and indiscriminate force against the civilian population. It carried out ethnic cleansings in Nagorno Karabakh proper and Armenian-populated areas of Azerbaijan, unleashing full-fledged military aggression against Nagorno Karabakh.

Despite the ongoing negotiation process and commitments undertaken since the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement, the Azeri leadership continues to interpret selectively the norms and principles of international law, thus escalating tension and mistrust, as well as ignoring the existing realities. Deluded by its language of threats and hostility, Azerbaijan has made a step forward in the wrong direction, and threatens sanctions against third-country nationals visiting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Such a policy of Azerbaijan fits perfectly into the logic of its domestic human rights record that it is striving to impose upon foreign citizens.

These highly irresponsible steps thwart any attempts to establish an atmosphere of trust between the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan, which would be essential for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. They also hinder the ongoing mediation efforts by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh.

Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that in spite of the artificial impediments created by the Azeri side, the number of tourists visiting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic steadily grows: throughout its independent history, tens of thousands of foreign citizens have already visited the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which attests to the safe and secure environment established by the freedom-loving people of Nagorno Karabakh, and growing international interest in the rich cultural and historical heritage of our native land. It is essential to note that the crime rate in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is one of the lowest in Europe, and no serious accident has ever been registered in our country with participation of a foreign citizen.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic urges the authorities of Azerbaijan to abandon counterproductive attempts to hinder visits of foreign nationals to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and direct its energy and resources, wasted on such groundless and provocative actions, towards settlement of substantial issues between the parties to the conflict, thus promoting peace and stability for the whole fragile region of the South Caucasus.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic welcomes and encourages the visits of foreign nationals, both officials and tourists, to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Such visits and people-to-people contacts in general contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation in the region and are essential for the international community to get truthful and objective information about the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

Stepanakert, 14 August 2013

United Nations A/67/965–S/2013/497

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 34 and 39

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I draw your attention to the fact that Azerbaijan is consistently and tendentiously attempting to mislead the States Members of the United Nations regarding the ceasefire violations along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.

In this regard, I attach hereto the results of the comparative analysis for the month of April 2013 (see annex, table 1), which clearly demonstrate that, of the 262 incidents reported by Azerbaijan during the month of April, only 43 coincide with the operational data of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia.

The Azerbaijani side continued to overstate the number of incidents reported for the month of May 2013 (see annex, table 2) and presented exaggerated data of ceasefire violations. This time again, of the 246 incidents, only 14 coincide with the operational data of the Armenian side.

Armenia reiterates its call to Azerbaijan to refrain from this unimpressive exercise and other propaganda steps and to act constructively in support of the efforts of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, aimed at reaching a viable resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-43288 (E) 270813

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Table 1

Comparison of the information reported to the United Nations by the Republic of Azerbaijan and the operational data of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia concerning the ceasefire violations for April 2013

No.	*Date*	*Specified time by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified time by the Republic of Armenia*	*Direction of the shot*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Armenia*	*Specified result by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified result by the Republic of Armenia*
1.	01.04	23:25-23:40	12:35	Jraberd	AK	AK	–	–
2.		23:25-23:40	11:25	N. Karmiraghbyur	AK	AK	–	–
3.	02.04	18:50-18:55	21:30	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
4.	03.04	13:20-13:35	07:35	N. Karmiraghbyur	AK	AK	–	–
5.		17:50-18:00	17:10		AK	AK	–	–
6.	04.04	17:10-17:20	17:30	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
7.	05.04	12:45-12:50	10:45-11:25		AK	PK	–	–
8.		12:45-12:50	12:50		AK	DSHK, AK, SVD	–	–
9.		12:45-12:50	11:45		AK	Sev net	–	–
10.		15:25-15:40	12:00		AK	Sev net	–	–
11.		15:25-15:40	13:05		AK	Sev net	–	–
12.		15:25-15:40	13:47	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
13.	07.04	23:35-23:40	09:50	Marzili	SVD	AK	–	–
14.		23:35-23:40	18:40		SVD	AK	–	–
15.	07.04	20:45-20:55	21:58	Kuropatkino	PK	AK	–	–
16.			22:26		AK	AK	–	–
17.			23:30-23:40		AK	AK	–	–
18.	08.04	10:35-10:50 21:45-22:00	19:35	Aghashi Veysali	AK	RPK	–	–
19.		19:40-19:45	18:40	Marzili	AK	AK Sev net	–	–
20.							–	–
21.		22:00-22:10	23:55		AK	AK	–	–

No.	Date	Specified time by the Republic of Azerbaijan	Specified time by the Republic of Armenia	Direction of the shot	Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Azerbaijan	Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Armenia	Specified result by the Republic of Azerbaijan	Specified result by the Republic of Armenia
22.	10.04	20:00	03:35-03:40	Kengerli	SVD	AK	–	–
23.		04:20-04:30	21:55	Aghashi Abduraghmanli	AK	PK	–	–
24.		23:45-23:50	16:15	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
25.		17:10-17:20	19:30	Marzili	AK	Sev net	–	–
26.	12.04	02:45-02:50	00:40	Kuropatkino	SVD	AK	–	–
27.		02:45-02:50	01:20		SVD	AK	–	–
28.		15:15-15:20	14:40		SVD	Sev net	–	–
29.		15:15-15:20	22:10		SVD	AK	–	–
30.	14.04	14:50-15:05	15:40		DSHK	AK	–	–
31.		14:50-15:05	23:33		DSHK	AK	–	–
32.	16.04	06:05-06:10	22:32		AK	AK PK	–	–
33.	17.04	21:55-22:00	16:45	Marzili	SVD	AK	–	–
34.	20.04	20:55-21:15	18:12	Kuropatkino	AK	Sev net	–	–
35.	21.04	18:50-18:55	23:50		AK	AK	–	–
36.	24.04	03:20-03:25	02:26		AK	PK	–	–
37.	26.04	01:55-02:00	20:55		SVD	AK	–	–
38.			19:25		SVD	AK	–	–
39.	28.04	22:20-22:25	14:50	Aghashi Veysali	AK	SVD PK	–	–
40.			20:47	Aghashi Veysali	AK	RPK	–	–
41.		12:15-12:20	22:45	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
42.			13:27		AK	SVD	–	–
43.		06:10-06:20	13:55	Talish	AK	SVD	–	–

AK — Kalashnikov rifle
PK — Kalashnikov machine gun
SVD — 7.9 mm sniper weapon
DSHK — 12.7 mm machine gun
RPK — 5.45 mm machine gun
Sev net — 12.7 mm sniper weapon

A/67/965
S/2013/497

Table 2

Comparison of the information reported to the United Nations by the Republic of Azerbaijan and the operational data of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia concerning the ceasefire violations for May 2013

No.	*Date*	*Specified time by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified time by the Republic of Armenia*	*Direction of the shot*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Armenia*	*Specified result by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified result by the Republic of Armenia*
1.	01.05	22:15-22:20	21:50	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
2.	08.05	02:00-02:05	03:55		AK	AK	–	–
3.	09.05	01:20-01:30	02:20		AK	AK	–	–
4.	09.05	04:25-04:30	11:30		AK	AK	–	–
5.	11.05	06:00-06:15	12:50		AK	AK	–	–
6.	14.05	14:50-14:55	07:20	Marzili	DSHK	SVD	–	–
7.	16.05	12:15-12:20	09:15	Bash Qarvend	AK	RPK	–	–
8.	24.05	18:28-18:35	18:25	Marzili	AK	Sev net	–	–
9.	25.05	14:55-15:15	19:15	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
10.	27.05	03:30-03:40	20:25	Mehdili	AK	AK	–	–
11.	29.05	14:40-15:05	13:40	Jraberd	AK	PK	–	–
12.		17:20-17:35	16:40		AK	RPG-7	–	–
13.		18:20-18:40	18:10		AK RPG-7	SAKO	–	–
14.	31.05	06:00-06:10	17:35	Kengerli	AK	PK	–	–

AK — Kalashnikov rifle
PK — Kalashnikov machine gun
SVD — 7.9 mm sniper weapon
DSHK — 12.7 mm machine gun
RPK — 5.45 mm machine gun
Sev net — 12.7 mm sniper weapon
RPG-7 — anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade launcher
SAKO — sniper rifle

United Nations S/2013/498

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 August 2013

Original: English

Identical letters dated 19 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to draw your attention to an alarming development in our region. On 17 August 2013, several mortar shells were fired from Syria near the Israeli town of Keshet, in grave violation of the 1974 separation of forces agreement. Despite the repeated warnings of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), mortar shells continued to be fired into Israel. Only after the third shell landed did IDF fire a warning shot.

These provocations occurred just as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was wrapping up his visit to our region. At the very moment that he was seeking to further the dream of peace, Israelis received yet another reminder of the reality of war.

Israel has repeatedly issued warnings and sent letters to the Security Council cautioning that these sorts of provocations will not be tolerated. Israel cannot be expected to stand by as Assad's reign of terror results in shells raining on our citizens.

The continuous attacks on our border have the potential to escalate an already tense situation and further destabilize the region. Israel has shown maximum restraint thus far. I urge the Security Council to address this development immediately before the situation further escalates.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Please recycle

United Nations S/2013/499

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 August 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2048 (2012) and 2103 (2013), and covers major political, security, human rights, humanitarian and socioeconomic developments since my report of 6 May 2013 (S/2013/262).

II. Restoration of and respect for constitutional order

A. Political situation

1. Overview of the political situation in the country

2. During the reporting period, the key political stakeholders of Guinea-Bissau reached consensus on arrangements for the remainder of the transition. International partners also pursued joint efforts towards assisting the country to address the challenges it faces.

3. On 30 April, representatives of the signatories of the transitional political pact and the political agreement of May 2012 agreed on key steps towards the restoration of constitutional order, namely, (a) that the political transition should end on 31 December 2013 and general elections should be held in November 2013; (b) that an inclusive Transitional Government should be appointed; and (c) that the National Assembly should elect the President of the National Electoral Commission on a proposal from the Supreme Council of Magistrates. To enhance the inclusiveness of the political consultations, non-parliamentary actors such as political parties, religious leaders and civil society organizations were included in the parliamentary commission, which was established by the National Assembly to review the transitional political pact and the political agreement of May 2012.

4. Meanwhile, negotiations continued on the formation of a more inclusive Transitional Government. As a result, the two biggest parties in Parliament, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) signed a memorandum of understanding on 17 May, in which they committed themselves to supporting the end of the transition by 31 December 2013, and to the formation of an inclusive Transitional Government.

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The two parties also emphasized the need for a framework for dialogue and consultations that would go beyond the transitional period. They further agreed to retain Mr. Rui Duarte de Barros as Transitional Prime Minister.

5. The Transitional Prime Minister initiated consultations on the formation of a new Transitional Government on 27 May, while the National Assembly held an extraordinary session from 27 to 29 May to discuss the transitional instruments. The Assembly adopted a Transitional Pact and Political Agreement, a Transition Road Map, and an Agreement on Principles for the Restoration of Constitutional Normality. The new Transitional Pact and Political Agreement provides, inter alia, for an amnesty for those involved in the military coup of 12 April 2012. It also provides for the establishment of a consultative council (Conselho de Concertação e Consulta) as a forum for political and social dialogue for the signatories of the Transitional Pact and Political Agreement, and for the re-establishment of the Parliamentary Commission on National Reconciliation.

6. My Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau, José Ramos-Horta, intensified his good offices, presenting national stakeholders with options for overcoming their differences in an inclusive and constructive fashion. On 6 June, reflecting the agreement between PAIGC and PRS, the Transitional President appointed a more inclusive Transitional Government led by Mr. Barros, who was retained as Transitional Prime Minister. The new Cabinet consists of 34 members, four of whom are women.

7. On 12 June, the National Assembly held an extraordinary session and elected Supreme Court Judge Augusto Mendes as President of the National Electoral Commission. It also elected Appeal Court Judge José Pedro Sambú as the Executive Secretary, and Katia Maria Augusta Lopes and Idriça Djaló as the Deputy Executive Secretaries of the Commission. The new leadership was sworn in on 14 June. On 28 June, the Transitional President issued a decree announcing that presidential and legislative elections would be held on 24 November 2013.

8. On 3 July, the Transitional Prime Minister presented the programme of the Transitional Government to the National Assembly. The programme focuses on the restoration of constitutional order and includes (a) the organization of presidential and legislative elections on 24 November 2013, and the revision of the Electoral Law and the overall legal framework to ensure a more transparent electoral process; (b) steps for the adoption of a legal framework for the country's first-ever municipal elections in 2014; (c) defence, security, justice and public administration reforms; (d) economic stabilization and transparency in fiscal management, the normalization of cooperation with international financial institutions, the promotion of agricultural and infrastructural development, and preparations for the holding of a donor round table in 2014; and (e) the continuing promotion of social harmony. The programme also stresses the Transitional Government's determination to improve the country's image and to strengthen its participation in subregional, regional and international organizations.

9. Following intensive consultations between my Special Representative and the transitional authorities, on 24 July, the Transitional Government created the National Commission for Planning and Strategic Coordination, whose task is to define the priorities for the remainder of the transition and its immediate aftermath. The Commission will develop a plan for the remainder of the transition that addresses needs in the areas of food security, health and education, outline priorities

for the first year of the government that will be formed following the presidential and legislative elections in November 2013, and plan a donor round table in 2014.

2. Overview of the human rights situation in the country

10. During the reporting period, the human rights situation remained largely unchanged; a number of cases of human rights violations and abuses were reported. The limited capacity of the security and justice sectors contributed to a persisting culture of impunity and lack of accountability in the country.

11. On 25 April, the Regional Military Court rendered its verdict in the case of the 17 suspects arrested in connection with the incident at the Bissalanca air force base in Bissau on 21 October 2012. Nine of the defendants were convicted of treason and dealing in prohibited weapons, and sentenced to three to five years of imprisonment, amid concerns over the independence and impartiality of the court. The nine convicted suspects appealed the verdict, and the case was still pending during the reporting period. Those convicted remained in detention at the air force base.

12. From 8 to 11 July, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ivan Šimonović, conducted a four-day mission to Guinea-Bissau at the invitation of the Transitional Government, to discuss the human rights situation in the country. He met with the Transitional President and the Transitional Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament, the Ministers of Justice and the Interior of the Transitional Government, the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Superior Military Court, the President of the National Human Rights Commission, civil society organizations, women's organizations, and international partners present in Bissau.

13. The Assistant Secretary-General also participated in the National Conference on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights from 10 to 12 July. The Conference was held pursuant to the recommendations of the Bamako Declaration and its strategic framework, which were adopted on 4 December 2011 by the Regional Conference on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights held in Mali. Guinea-Bissau is the first participating State to convene such a conference.

14. The Conference adopted a range of recommendations, including proposals for (a) reforms in the justice, public administration, security and defence sectors; (b) the establishment of a commission of inquiry into political assassinations and other politically motivated crimes; (c) the ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and (d) the promotion of national unity and good citizenship through comprehensive human rights education.

15. In his meetings with national stakeholders, the Assistant Secretary-General emphasized the importance of ensuring freedom of expression and peaceful assembly before, during and after the elections. He also noted that those guarantees were vital not only for the credibility of the elections but also to foster longer-term stability. He drew particular attention to the issues of violence and discrimination against women, and recommended the adoption of measures to increase women's participation in public and political life, including the introduction of minimum quotas for women in the next elections. He also urged the national authorities to provide greater protection for human rights defenders, journalists, victims and witnesses, and emphasized the urgency of ensuring effective and credible progress in the investigations into political assassinations and other cases of political violence prior to the elections of 2013, in order to deter future attacks.

16. During the period under review, the prohibition of press conferences, interviews or communiqués relating to the coup d'état of 12 April 2012 and other "cases under investigation", as announced in a communiqué issued by the Prosecutor General on 29 September 2012, remained in force. However, no new overt attempts to curtail the freedom of the media were reported.

3. Regional and international efforts towards the restoration of and respect for constitutional order

17. On 10 May, the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission convened a meeting of the configuration in New York. During the meeting, my Special Representative appealed to the international community, including the Peacebuilding Commission, to re-engage with Guinea-Bissau. He noted that the Commission and Guinea-Bissau should revise their instrument of engagement (revised strategic framework), which could be initiated before the upcoming elections. He concluded by expressing hope that the Peacebuilding Fund would be able to provide its share of support to the ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

18. On that occasion, the Chair affirmed that the configuration would continue to follow closely the situation in Guinea-Bissau and support, in close coordination with my Special Representative, efforts to find a lasting solution to the political crisis. She also indicated that once meaningful steps were taken to restore constitutional order, such as the formation of a more inclusive Transitional Government and the adoption of a new "regime pact" and a road map for holding elections by the end of 2013, the configuration would resume its engagement with Guinea-Bissau.

19. On 16 May, the European Union released a communiqué following a meeting with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held in Brussels, expressing its readiness to support elections in Guinea-Bissau once all the requirements were met. The communiqué also indicated the European Union and ECOWAS agreement that meaningful and irreversible reforms were essential for the country's stabilization and prosperity, starting with the complete restructuring of the defence and security forces, particularly the renewal of the top military leadership, and far-reaching reforms in the security and justice sectors and the political system. The European Union and ECOWAS also expressed grave concern about the worrying infiltration in State structures of organized crime and illicit drug trafficking networks, noting that the detention of the former Navy Chief of Staff, Bubo Na Tchuto, in the United States on drug trafficking charges and the indictment by the United States of the current Chief of General Staff, General António Indjai, for alleged trafficking illustrated the gravity of the problem. They stressed that persons linked to any further violence or anti-constitutional and destabilizing activities would be held accountable by the international community. They commended the renewed involvement of the international community in Guinea-Bissau, in particular through the close collaboration between the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), ECOWAS, the European Union and the United Nations. Finally, they stressed the importance of the preservation and good management of the natural resources of Guinea-Bissau in accordance with applicable laws. On 18 June, the Council of the European Union decided to maintain restrictions against 21 military personnel of Guinea-Bissau involved in the coup of 12 April 2012, including the leaders of the military.

20. International partners welcomed the formation of the new Transitional Government on 6 June. The Government of Portugal, on 11 June, described the move as a positive development that created expectations of democratic normalization.

21. The African Union Peace and Security Council and the European Union Political and Security Committee, at their sixth annual joint consultative meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 11 June, urged the new Transitional Government to prioritize preparations for democratic elections leading to the restoration of constitutional order before the end of the year. The two organs stressed the need to implement security sector reform and to fight organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and illegal fishing. They also stressed the need to protect human rights, to promote the rule of law and to end impunity in the country. In addition, they highlighted the importance of the preservation and management of Guinea-Bissau's natural resources, including the sustainable exploitation of marine and land resources. They commended the joint efforts of the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, the European Union and the United Nations towards the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau.

22. The second joint assessment mission of the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, the European Union and the United Nations was conducted in Bissau from 8 to 11 July. In addition to the original five entities, the International Organization of la Francophonie participated in the mission. The mission met with the transitional authorities, political parties, civil society organizations, women's groups and the diplomatic corps accredited to Guinea-Bissau in order to receive an update on the current political, security and socioeconomic situation. The mission was encouraged by the considerable progress on the transitional process, including the approval of the consensual revised Transitional Pact and Political Agreement, the appointment of the President and members of the National Electoral Commission and the designation of 24 November 2013 as the date for the elections. National stakeholders were unanimously of the view that the problems of Guinea-Bissau will not end with the elections, as the structural causes of the recurring political crises in the country will need to be fundamentally addressed. Some of the stakeholders strongly expressed the view that, in order to ensure sustainable stability in the medium to long term, it was necessary to maintain a culture of inclusive and broad-based government after the forthcoming elections. The mission recommended reviving the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau in the coming months, including the establishment of its Bissau-based chapter. It also recommended the establishment of a follow-up mechanism integrating the Bissau-based representatives of the African Union, the United Nations, ECOWAS, and the European Union. The mission encouraged CPLP and the International Organization of la Francophonie to deploy representatives in Bissau.

23. The Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS welcomed the signing of the revised transitional instruments in a communiqué issued on 18 July at their forty-third ordinary session, held in Abuja. They urged the authorities of Guinea-Bissau to ensure the holding of presidential and legislative elections on 24 November 2013, as scheduled. They also reiterated their call on the African Union and other international partners to lift the sanctions imposed on Guinea-Bissau following the coup of 12 April 2012, and to resume bilateral cooperation with the country. They directed the ECOWAS Commission to take urgent steps, in close consultation with other international partners, to resume the meetings of the International Contact

Group on Guinea-Bissau. Finally, they extended the mandate of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) for another 12 months, until 16 May 2014.

24. My Special Representative attended the eighteenth regular meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries in Maputo on 18 July. The Council adopted a declaration on the situation in Guinea-Bissau reiterating the Community's "unconditional" support for Guinea-Bissau and the importance of coordinating its efforts with other international partners. The Council's declaration also noted that the lack of effective civilian oversight over the defence and security forces threatens the political process and the functioning of State institutions. The Council urged political actors in Guinea-Bissau to ensure the holding of elections with full respect for democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to create conditions for the safe return and freedom of all citizens in exile, while fighting impunity and drug trafficking. In addition, the Council decided that CPLP would appoint a Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau.

4. Efforts towards a democratic electoral process

25. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2103 (2013) in which the Council mandated the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), inter alia, to assist in creating an environment conducive to the holding of free, fair and transparent elections, I dispatched a needs assessment mission to Bissau from 3 to 16 July. The mission, which was composed of representatives of the Electoral Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNIOGBIS, met with a broad range of interlocutors, including both national and international stakeholders. The mission took note of the stated commitment of the Transitional Government to conduct the elections by the announced date of 24 November 2013. It however observed that there was limited activity in preparation for the elections, and that public debate on the elections had largely focused on modalities for conducting the registration of voters, reiterating previous concerns about the existing manual registration system. The mission advised the Transitional Government to consider improvements to the existing manual registration system, to make up for the identified deficiencies, rather than introducing the biometric system, considering the short time frame of the remainder of the transition and the high estimated costs of conducting biometric voter registration.

26. Similarly, at the ministerial meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council held in Abuja on 15 July, most members of the Council objected to the introduction of biometric voter registration for the upcoming elections as proposed by the Transitional Government, arguing that it would negatively affect the electoral timeline, and would require substantial funds that are not available.

27. Since the signatories of the Transitional Pact and Political Agreement had consensually expressed preference for biometric voter registration, the Transitional President met with political parties and civil society organizations on 22 July to discuss the voter registration methodology in an effort to ensure consensus on a realistic approach. He tasked the Parliamentary Commission, which was established to review the transitional instruments of May 2012, to advise whether manual or biometric voter registration would be suitable for the country. He also requested the Commission to review the electoral legislation and propose necessary amendments. The Commission submitted its report to the Transitional President on 1 August. He

announced on 2 August that "improved" manual voter registration would be used for the general elections of 24 November, and that an amendment to the electoral law would be submitted to Parliament.

B. Security situation

28. During the reporting period, the security situation remained calm. Following a meeting of the Transitional President and a delegation of the Nigerian armed forces, the Guinea-Bissau Chief of General Staff announced, on 6 May, that the Transitional Government had requested ECOWAS, and particularly Nigeria, to support Guinea-Bissau in jointly patrolling its territorial waters to help fight illicit drug, arms and human trafficking. On 17 May, national media carried a report by a representative of the ocean initiative of *National Geographic*, which highlighted extensive illegal fishing in Guinea-Bissau's waters.

29. A delegation from ECOWAS consisting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Togo, and a representative of the Chief of Defence Staff of Senegal, arrived in Bissau on 27 May. Addressing the handover and contingent rotation and command ceremony of ECOMIB on the same day, the Chief of Defence Staff of Côte d'Ivoire highlighted the challenges confronting the mission. He underlined the importance of and the need to speed up the security sector reform process, and to ensure the efficient handling of the welfare of veterans of the liberation war. He also mentioned the future role of the ECOMIB police units in support of efforts to ensure security during the upcoming elections. The ECOWAS military chiefs met with the Transitional President and the Transitional Prime Minister on 27 May and participated in a meeting with the Guinea-Bissau Chief of General Staff on 28 May to discuss regional defence and security issues. They also focused on the status of implementation of the memorandum of understanding concerning the road map for the defence and security sector reform programme signed by ECOWAS and Guinea-Bissau in November 2012, particularly the rehabilitation of military installations and implementation of the pension fund programme for members of the defence and security institutions. The Chief of Defence Staff of Côte d'Ivoire also highlighted the need to improve the living conditions of ECOMIB personnel.

30. On 31 May, the commanding officer of ECOMIB confirmed to UNIOGBIS that ECOMIB was conducting patrols in all regions of the country, with the exception of the Bijagos islands. He also stated that ECOMIB had commenced the coordination of future activities related to military and police training with the Ministry of Defence, as part of the security sector reform process. He affirmed that ECOWAS was planning for the reinforcement of ECOMIB with an extra police company to better support the electoral process.

III. Socioeconomic and humanitarian situation

31. The overall economic and social situation in the country remained difficult during the reporting period and the State continued to face challenges in meeting its financial commitments. The situation was compounded by an uncertain cashew export season that could further jeopardize economic growth prospects, weaken the State financially and worsen the already deteriorating food security situation in

the country. The State budget for 2013, which was approved on 15 July, will require budgetary support of CFAF 12 billion (US$ 24 million), of which only about 25 per cent has been secured.

32. The current cashew export season was negatively affected by lack of coordination among different operators and government institutions on setting key parameters, such as the indicative price and the export surcharge. It also suffered from controversies and delays in operationalizing a new agency to promote the cashew sector and liquidity shortages in local commercial banks. On 13 June, the National Assembly urged the Transitional Government to immediately reset the export tax at CFAF 50 per kg of cashew nuts and to urgently adopt mechanisms for monitoring and implementing a minimum reference price of CFAF 210 per kg.

33. The international price for cashew remained relatively low compared to previous years, which had a direct impact on food security since the cost of rice, the country's staple food, had remained relatively high in local markets. About 80 per cent of households depend on income from the production of cashew nuts for their livelihoods. As a result, many households resorted to various negative coping strategies, such as reducing the quantity and quality of meals, destocking livestock, as well as seasonal migration. In the most severely affected regions (Quinara, Oio, Biombo and Bijagos), food insecurity affected 40 per cent of the population. In addition according to a rapid food security assessment conducted jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme with relevant government bodies in June 2013, an estimated 48 per cent of households had stocks of cereals that would last for only one month.

34. From 28 April to 10 May, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) fielded a consultative mission to Guinea-Bissau. The mission confirmed a growth rate of minus 1.5 per cent in 2012, but indicated that the economy could rebound to a 3.5 per cent growth in 2013, subject to certain conditions, including a positive cashew export season. The mission's report stressed that recurrent internal conflicts had negatively affected Guinea-Bissau's economic growth, as well as efforts to reduce poverty, thus affecting social advancement in the country. It also highlighted the fact that the country's economic performance would be contingent on an inclusive political process and progress in security sector reform efforts.

35. From 16 to 18 June, the World Bank fielded a mission to Guinea-Bissau to discuss economic development priorities with the Transitional Government and development partners, and the support already being provided in the context of a decision by its Board on a possible re-engagement of the World Bank in the last quarter of the year.

36. In close collaboration with IMF and the World Bank, UNDP continued to closely monitor the economic and financial situation in the country, to analyse information on both the cashew season and the implementation of the budget, and to provide technical advice to the Transitional Government on planning, public finance management and coordination.

37. Since May, an increasing number of cholera cases have been reported in the Tombali region. As at 7 August, 260 cholera cases and 22 fatalities had been reported. The Ministry of Health had activated the Epidemic Management Committee to coordinate actions aimed at containing the outbreak in Tombali and promoting preventive actions countrywide. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has

been supporting preparedness and response activities, including advocacy for the declaration of an epidemic by the Transitional Government. A fundraising strategy was being developed by the United Nations country team for a multisectoral response in the whole country, including prevention and case management.

38. The period under review was marked by strikes by civil servants demanding the payment of unpaid salary arrears and subsidies, as well as improved working conditions. On 7 May, public school teachers went on strike for the third time in the 2012/13 school year. As the Transitional Government and the two teachers' unions failed to reach an agreement, the two unions extended the strike for over two weeks, jeopardizing completion of the school year, in which children had already lost over a third of classes. My Special Representative and UNICEF undertook mediation efforts between the teachers' unions and the Transitional Government, which resulted in the ending of the strike on 23 May. Indications were that the strike had not affected all regions in the country. UNICEF supported the Ministry of Education in identifying the essential curriculum to be covered so that the most affected regions could take compensatory measures, such as extending the school year by one to two weeks. Workers of the health sector launched a seven-day strike on 4 June, endangering the health and lives of patients who were sent home from hospitals for lack of personnel.

39. Meanwhile, the press focused on increased illicit exploitation of natural resources during the reporting period, especially illegal logging. The rate of depletion of the few remaining forests in the country and related ecosystems had continued unabated. During an extraordinary session of the National Assembly on 13 June, parliamentarians approved a resolution on illegal logging, requesting the Government to urgently address the situation.

IV. Observations

40. The Transitional Government and political actors have made important progress by approving the consensual Transitional Pact and Political Agreement, setting up a broad-based inclusive Transitional Government, appointing the President and members of the National Electoral Commission and setting the date of 24 November 2013 for the elections. I am encouraged that stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau were able to accommodate their diverse perspectives and reach consensus on these crucial steps towards the restoration of constitutional order.

41. I urge national stakeholders to make every effort to hold the legislative and presidential elections within the agreed time schedule. It is critical to ensure a credible, transparent, inclusive and democratic electoral process at all stages. I welcome the announcement by the Transitional President that improved manual voter registration will be used for the general elections of 24 November. I urge all stakeholders to uphold the principle of consensus going forward, and to agree on an electoral code of conduct aimed at creating a peaceful electoral environment. I call on Guinea-Bissau's international partners to contribute to this vital electoral process. The United Nations will continue to provide assistance in line with the recommendations of the recent needs assessment mission and to support the mobilization of necessary resources.

42. While presidential and legislative elections are a prerequisite to the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, the country needs to depart from decades

of political and military instability and a "winner takes all" approach to politics. Elections should be followed by longer-term concerted efforts aimed at addressing the structural root causes of political instability and discontent. In the interim, there needs to be a new culture of politics which favours consensus and inclusion, so that the State can be rebuilt and serve the interests of all citizens rather than those of a few. I therefore urge national stakeholders, in particular political actors, to pursue the route of constructive and inclusive dialogue aimed at building consensus on the key reforms that must be undertaken in the coming years.

43. In this regard, I welcome the creation of the National Commission for Planning and Strategic Coordination. The expansion of the United Nations presence from two to four regional offices will strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to support national actors in extending the consultations beyond Bissau, thus ensuring meaningful nationwide participation in efforts towards the restoration of constitutional order and the promotion of good governance and socioeconomic development.

44. The progress made in recent months in the political process is also due to the engagement of international partners. I call on the international partners of Guinea-Bissau to remain engaged so as to promote further progress. I also welcome the initiative of the African Union to lead the second joint assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau, involving ECOWAS, CPLP, the European Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie and the United Nations, from 8 to 10 July. The mission helped the participating entities to forge a common understanding of the evolving situation in the country. It also served to reassure the citizens of Guinea-Bissau of the international community's will to continue to assist them in the search for sustainable solutions to the political crisis.

45. I commend the leadership and efforts of Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti in her capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission from December 2007 to May 2013, which contributed to the advancement of the country's peacebuilding process. The configuration should continue to play a critical role in support of national efforts towards the restoration of constitutional order and the consolidation of peace, stability and economic development.

46. I remain concerned about the persisting culture of impunity and lack of accountability in Guinea-Bissau. I welcome the holding of the National Conference on Impunity, Justice and Human Rights in Bissau in July 2013, and I urge once again the transitional authorities to take swift action to fight impunity and promote justice. I call on national stakeholders to implement the recommendations of the Conference, as a matter of urgency.

47. Guinea-Bissau faces a difficult socioeconomic situation caused by multiple factors, including a negative cashew export season that has a direct impact on the livelihoods of rural communities and increases food insecurity and malnutrition. I therefore urge the international community and other partners to seek ways to fund assistance programmes for those affected communities.

48. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the staff of UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team, under the leadership of my Special Representative, José Ramos-Horta, as well as to Guinea-Bissau's regional and international partners for their contributions to the efforts to restore constitutional order and promote peacebuilding in the country.

United Nations S/2013/500

Security Council

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21 August 2013

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Letter dated 21 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the representative of the National Coalition of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces dated 21 August 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Antonio **Bernardini**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 21 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the National Coalition of the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces and the Supreme Military Council, I would like to draw your urgent attention to the latest attacks committed by Syrian regime forces against civilians in areas surrounding Damascus. There are strong indications and reliable reports that chemical weapons were used in these attacks, which may have killed in excess of 1,100 people

Early this morning, the Syrian regime unleashed a series of bombardments of opposition-held suburbs of Damascus. This included the launching of rockets with toxic agents against the civilian neighbourhoods concentrated in eastern Ghouta, specifically Joubar, Zamalka, Ain Terma and Moadamiya. Initial medical reports have indicated that casualties, many of them women and children, have displayed symptoms associated with the use of chemical weapons, including asphyxiation, salivating and blurred vision.

On the basis of these reports, the Syrian Coalition requests that the United Nations urgently dispatch its fact-finding mission, which is already in Damascus, mere kilometers away from the sites of the attacks, to travel to these sites immediately to conduct a full investigation. To protect the credibility of United Nations engagement in Syria, the United Nations fact-finding mission must respond rapidly to these latest attacks. The use of chemical weapons in suppressing a popular democratic uprising is a war crime and a crime against humanity, and must be treated with the utmost level of seriousness and urgency.

The Syrian Coalition and Supreme Military Council reiterate their willingness to cooperate fully with the mission and are prepared to offer any assistance that can facilitate the mission's activities in areas under their control. The regime must also give the United Nations team unfettered access to all areas and individuals that can assist it in its work to ensure that those responsible for this latest heinous attack are held accountable.

The Syrian Coalition reiterates its complete rejection of the use of chemical weapons. It remains committed to full accountability for anyone found responsible for chemical weapons use, in accordance with international law.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition to the United Nations

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General Assembly
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General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to refer to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia, dated 1 July 2013 (A/67/924-S/2013/396), which is a clumsy attempt to react to the brief research previously submitted for your consideration (A/67/875-S/2013/313) on the non-compliance by the Republic of Armenia with United Nations Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993). It is clear that Armenia is once again opposing the facts which point to its policy of aggression, hostility and hatred, outright lies and falsification.

Thus, in the words of the Permanent Representative of Armenia, Azerbaijan "makes desperate attempts to distort and misinterpret the Security Council resolutions of 1993 and the subsequent presidential statements, as well as the statements and comments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Member States pertinent to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue". Such a deduction is obviously not only unproven but is also easily refuted by the aforementioned research, which is based on official United Nations and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and also statements by Member States represented in the Security Council. The documents in question prove the unsubstantiated nature of the Armenian version of events and testify to the intentional non-fulfilment by Yerevan of the requirements

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of the Security Council resolutions, and its determined efforts to undermine the process of settling the conflict on the basis of international law. A comparative analysis of the primary sources of these documents and the explanation thereof in the research is sufficient to be convinced that the Permanent Representative of Armenia in essence is accusing not Azerbaijan, but the United Nations Secretary-General, the members of the Security Council, the OSCE governing bodies and the international community as a whole of "inexpensive narratives" and "lies".

The Permanent Representative of Armenia asserts that "the essence of the problem lies in the exercise by the people of Nagorno-Karabakh of their inalienable right to self-determination" and the conflict allegedly broke out owing to "coercive policies" of Azerbaijan in response to this requirement. The Armenian diplomat gets so carried away that he accuses Azerbaijan of carrying out "military aggression against the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh" which was also allegedly "condemned by the international community". The letters and statements by Armenian officials leave no doubt that they perceive the role, place and obligations of their country, as a member of the United Nations, in an extremely inappropriate manner. Otherwise, the Permanent Representative of Armenia would not have had to imagine that the international community condemned the "aggression of Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh". He would also have been able to notice that the Security Council not only did not mention, in any of its four resolutions or in any of the New York statements of its President, the existence of "the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh", "the people of Nagorno-Karabakh", its "right to self-determination" and "military aggression" on the part of Azerbaijan, but rather condemned the use of force in relation to Azerbaijan and the occupation of its territory; confirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its international borders; confirmed that the region of Daghlyq-Garabagh (Nagorny-Karabakh) is a part of Azerbaijan; and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all occupied territories (resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993)).

In his attempts to mislead the United Nations community, the Permanent Representative of Armenia asserts that in the aforementioned brief research Azerbaijan appears unable to cite any Security Council document adopted after the ceasefire declared on 12 May 1994 which demands the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories. In order to prove the absurdity of this kind of view and the conclusions based on it, it is sufficient to refer to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the research, which recall the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 26 April 1995. In this document, the Council reaffirmed, "all its relevant resolutions, inter alia, on the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region", and also the "inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory". As is well known, the resolutions to which the President of the Security Council refers in his statement of 26 April 1995 contain the unambiguous requirement to withdraw the occupying forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. It is also clear that Armenia has single-mindedly ignored all the key Security Council instructions regarding the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and also the inviolability of international borders. The letter that from the Permanent Representative of Armenia is further proof of that.

In addition to contradicting irrefutable facts and documents produced by international organizations, the arguments of the Permanent Representative of

Armenia are not consistent with the declarations made by the most senior leaders of his own country, however surprising that may seem. Thus, the President of Armenia, Serge Sarkissian, publicly acknowledged that the war was started by Armenia and that the aim of the war was to fulfil the long nurtured plan of seizing Azerbaijani territory. Moreover, he made it unequivocally clear that during the active military phase of the conflict, it was Armenia that intentionally ignored the demands of the Security Council for the immediate cessation of all military activities and hostile acts for the purposes of establishing a stable ceasefire. In reality, at the very time when there was a real possibility of halting the bloodshed and saving the lives of thousands of people, the leaders of Armenia and the separatist regime which it had created in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan followed a different line of reasoning. Anyone who wishes to be convinced that the words of the President of Armenia are not the "inexpensive narratives" of Azerbaijani propaganda may refer to his 15 December 2000 interview with the British journalist Thomas de Waal (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/04/president-interview-and-tragic-anniversary/9vpa). The following response by Mr. Sarkissian to the question of whether he regrets the deaths of thousands of people is also revealing: "I do not regret anything at all", because "such upheavals are necessary, even if it costs thousands of lives". Of course, in this context, the arguments of the Permanent Representative of Armenia concerning the "aggression of Azerbaijan" and the "provocative acts" of my country are merely absurd and demonstrate an absence of responsibility.

The comments made by the Armenian diplomat concerning human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan do not withstand criticism. With a wealth of experience and skills in its bloody reprisals against the peaceful Azerbaijani population during the conflict, the most senior leaders of Armenia have, on more than one occasion, resorted to the cruellest methods of dealing with political opponents inside their own country. There are more than sufficient facts to prove this. In addition, the appropriate United Nations bodies have repeatedly expressed their concern at the spirit of intolerance which reigns in Armenia, and its policy and practice of discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, refugees, asylum seekers, women and children.

In order to cover up the results of the unlawful use of force and ethnic cleansing, the Permanent Representative of Armenia again refers to the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. In reality, notwithstanding the concept of self-determination adopted in international law, Yerevan is attempting to impose the view that this principle may be applied in the form of unilateral secession for the Armenian ethnic minority living in Azerbaijan. The danger associated with this is obvious. An irresponsible approach of this kind is contrary to the true value of self-determination, threatens the unity of all multinational societies and in essence provides clear encouragement for the spread of discrimination and intolerance on racial, ethnic and religious grounds.

The demands of Yerevan for the secession of part of the territory of a neighbouring State with the native ethnic group living there sound all the more strange in the light of the fact that, unlike Azerbaijan and other States in the region, Armenia is a uniquely monoethnic country, having achieved that shameful position by expelling all non-Armenians, including Azerbaijanis. Armenia is also conducting a similar openly racist policy in the region of Daglyqh-Garabagh and in other occupied Azerbaijani territories. Thus, the unscrupulous nature of Armenia's motives is perfectly clear, since it baselessly insists on ethnic-based privileges for

the Armenian minority through the discriminatory flouting of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the significantly more numerous Azerbaijani population.

Furthermore, it is a well known fact that, in accordance with international law, the principle of self-determination applies in reality to three categories of peoples, namely, (a) peoples of sovereign States; (b) peoples of colonially formed territorial units; and (c) peoples under foreign domination, subjugation and exploitation, including peoples under foreign military occupation. There is no doubt that the members of the Armenian ethnic minority group living in the region of Daglyqh-Garabagh do not fit into any of these categories of peoples and will never be considered an independent subject with the right to self-determination. By contrast, Armenia itself has committed aggression, has expelled hundreds of thousands of people from their places of permanent residence, has occupied Azerbaijani territories, has committed the most serious international crimes during the war which it unleashed and has committed gross violations of the right to self-determination of the people of Azerbaijan.

As is well known, in its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice confirmed the illegality of unilateral secession which is connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (*jus cogens*). Consequently, the claims made by Armenia, which resorted to the illegal use of force to seize the territory of Azerbaijan and committed the most serious international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and even genocide, run counter to the norms of international law and are without foundation.

Officials from Armenia often portray their own thoughts on international legal norms and the peace process as allegedly reflecting the position of the international mediators who are the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group. Further convincing proof of this is provided by consulting the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia of 1 July 2013. At the same time, it is readily apparent that Armenia fails to mention the fact that, in its proposals regarding principles for the settlement of the conflict, the same international mediators refer to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which, inter alia, instructs participating States to "respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States". In actual reality, Armenia has never observed this fundamental obligation and has committed gross violations of international legal norms and principles, including primarily those which relate to the right of peoples to self-determination and the territorial integrity of States.

Thus, the principles of the non-use of force or the threat of force and the territorial integrity of States, as well as the right to self-determination in the context of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, are aimed at resolving the main issues connected with the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories, the fulfilment by peoples forcibly expelled from their homes of the inalienable right to return and the establishment of relations between two States, on the basis of respect for territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

More anecdotal in nature in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia is the consideration of the reasons which have allegedly caused the Security Council to cease adoption of further resolutions on the conflict. According to the highly original logic of the Armenian diplomat, this has allegedly happened because the violation of the resolutions adopted has diminished their significance, undermined the authority of the Security Council and rendered its resolutions ineffective. Obviously, such a judgement is evidence of the uninformed position of the Armenian ambassador not only regarding the circumstances of his State, but also concerning the functions and powers of the Security Council, which, according to the Charter of the United Nations, has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In addition, the reality is that Armenia openly acknowledges the logic it is following, ignoring the resolutions of the Security Council, which apparently out of concern for its own authority can simply refuse to fulfil its duties and exercise its prerogatives if the decisions it takes are not implemented. The opinion expressed by Armenia, which has finally come to believe in the principle of impunity, may in essence also be considered an open call to discard the existing system and principles of international law.

The conclusion is self-evident. In reality, by ignoring the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, continuing the illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories, conducting a policy of hostility and hatred, and denying the right of more than one million Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes, Armenia is opposing the settlement of the conflict in accordance with the fundamental norms and principles of international law, and pursuing the aim of colonization and annexation of Azerbaijani lands. There is no doubt that such an approach has absolutely no chance of success. The region of Daglyqh-Garabagh is an inalienable part of Azerbaijan, and the only way to resolve existing problems, achieve a settlement of the conflict and establish civilized relations between two neighbouring States is to put a stop to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, fully re-establish the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and immediately provide for compliance with the inalienable right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83, and also as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tofig **Musayev**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 14 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in June 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as an official document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline Ziade
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the identical letters dated 14 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 June 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles, a Land Rover and a Kaminkar moved from the Ghajar bridge to the area opposite the Wazzani observation point, where 20 soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence to the area opposite the Wazzani Fort resort. At 0920 hours, the patrol headed back to the Ghajar bridge position.
	2240	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles moved from the Ghajar bridge position to the area opposite the Wazzani observation point, where two soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence to the area opposite the Wazzani Fort resort. At 2300 hours, the patrol returned to the Ghajar bridge position.
2 June 2013	1218	A member of an Israeli enemy patrol opposite point B83 (Kafr Killa) trained his weapon on the driver of a vehicle that happened to be passing on the Lebanese side.
3 June 2013	0945	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising four Hummer vehicles, three Land Rover vehicles and a civilian car moved from the Ghajar bridge position to the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where 16 soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. Eight of them crossed the technical fence to the area opposite the Wazzani Fort resort and measured the dimensions of the area. At 1315 hours, the patrol returned into occupied territory.
	1600	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle moved from a position east of Maysat to the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where five soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. Three of them crossed the technical fence by some 40 metres, reaching a point opposite the Wazzani Fort resort. At 1635 hours, the patrol left for the Ghajar bridge position.
4 June 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Merkava tanks moved to the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where five soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. Three of the soldiers and two of the tanks crossed the technical fence by some 40 metres. The third tank took up a position overlooking the Wazzani Fort resort.
	1052	An Israeli enemy Merkava tank trained its cannon on the Lebanese Army position of Markaba.
5 June 2013	1345	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and three Land Rover vehicles moved into the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where three soldiers stepped out, opened the gate, crossed the technical fence and approached the riverbank.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
8 June 2013	1020	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer and five Land Rover vehicles, one of them equipped with a surveillance camera, drove up to the gate opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where 20 soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by some 50 metres.
10 June 2013	0830	An Israeli enemy Merkava tank crossed the technical fence opposite the Wazzani resorts, positioning itself behind the berm, followed by four trucks, a Falasha construction machine and a roller. Some workers paved the road that the Israeli enemy had recently damaged, accompanied by a hostile patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles and three Land Rover vehicles. At 1600 hours, work stopped and they left the site.
11 June 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy foot patrol comprising 11 soldiers entered the Wazzani area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point, where its members opened the gate and crossed the technical fence into the work site in the above-mentioned area.
12 June 2013	1400	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising nine soldiers accompanied by a police dog in the area opposite the town of Abbasiyah crossed the technical fence by some 80 metres within the territory with regard to which Lebanon maintains a claim.
13 June 2013	0445	Powerful explosions and bursts of medium machine-gun fire were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
14 June 2013	0800	Two Israeli enemy Merkava tanks positioned themselves behind the berm opposite the Lebanese Army observation point in the Wazzani area, followed by another patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a Defender, at which point six soldiers stepped out and crossed the technical fence onto the road that the enemy had previously repaired. At 0945 hours, the Merkava tank crossed the technical fence and positioned itself on the hill opposite the observation point.
	1100 1150	Bursts of medium machine-gun fire were heard near the Radar position within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1130	While Lebanese citizen Fadi Rabah Awadah was fishing within Lebanese territory on the west bank of the Wazzani river, some 400 metres from the Wazzani Fort in the direction of the Roman bridge, nine Israeli enemy soldiers lowered themselves into the river, crossed the withdrawal line and fired at him without hitting him. They took the fishing equipment that was with him.
16 June 2013	2050, 2100	Several explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms while a helicopter flew overhead.
19 June 2013	1710	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank, two Hummer vehicles and a Land Rover moved into the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point in the Wazzani area, where 15 soldiers stepped out of their vehicles and crossed the technical fence. The tank followed them, positioning itself behind the berm and training its cannon on Lebanese territory. The soldiers deployed along the length of the road that had recently been repaired.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
20 June 2013	2200 2300	The Israeli enemy fired three flares over the Radar position within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
21 June 2013	2205	Two Israeli enemy soldiers near the Hanita area within occupied Palestinian territory directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army position for approximately one minute.
22 June 2013	1010	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Land Rover went into the Wazzani area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point, where two soldiers stepped out. The patrol was followed by a Merkava tank that crossed the technical fence and positioned itself behind one of the hills in the area.
24 June 2013	1545	Two Israeli enemy Merkava tanks positioned themselves on the hill opposite a Lebanese Army position in Kafr Shuba and trained their cannons on Lebanese territory.
	1850	Three members of an Israeli enemy patrol trained their weapons on Lebanese Army soldiers near point TP37 (Udaysah).
	2345	The Israeli enemy fired three flares over the Radar position. Three explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
26 June 2013	1040	An Israeli enemy patrol stopped at the separation wall opposite Kafr Killa and its members loaded their weapons in the direction of a Lebanese Army patrol.
27 June 2013	0600	A group of Israeli enemy soldiers was seen departing from the area between Duhayrah and Alma al-Sha'b. The group had been positioned north of the Blue Line opposite 1-BP7, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty by a distance of some 50 metres.
29 June 2013	2145	From the Labbunah-Jall al-Alam position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese Army military equipment in Labbunah for approximately one minute.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 June 2013	2050	An Israeli enemy launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 5 for 20 seconds.
11 June 2013	1135 1140	An Israeli enemy launch crossed the line of buoys by some 100 metres within Lebanese territorial waters north of buoy No. 6. The launch then returned to occupied Palestinian territorial waters south of the line of buoys.
	1410	An Israeli enemy launch crossed the line of buoys by some 10 metres within Lebanese territorial waters next to buoy No. 2. The launch then returned to occupied Palestinian territorial waters south of the line of buoys.
12 June 2013	1000	Three Israeli enemy launches on the open sea at the line of buoys opposite Ra's Naqurah installed two new buoys along the line of buoys beyond buoy No. 8.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 June 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
2 June 2013	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Zahlah before leaving at 1440 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0920	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
3 June 2013	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1710 hours over Naqurah.
	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Naqurah.
	1505	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1635 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2100 2145	Two Israeli enemy helicopters were seen dropping approximately 20 heat balloons off Tyre. Two helicopters were seen over Kafra town, and two other helicopters were seen over the sea off Naqurah.
4 June 2013	0435	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0720 hours over Naqurah.
	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1740 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Rumaysh.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1335 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2355	An Israeli enemy helicopter violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Lebanese territorial waters off Tyre.
5 June 2013	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2015 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Beirut. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
	1620 1630	A foreign object was seen circling above Shab'a town towards the Radar position in the occupied Shab'a Farms. A black and white appendage was attached to the lowest part of the object.
6 June 2013	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1315 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1940 hours over Naqurah.
	1220	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1405	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1600 hours over Aytarun.
7 June 2013	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1615 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.
	1055	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
8 June 2013	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1230 hours over Naqurah.
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 June 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Sidon. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
10 June 2013	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1655 hours over Naqurah.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1235	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
11 June 2013	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, the South and Hirmil before leaving at 2110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Akkar and Tripoli before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1425 hours over Naqurah.
	1045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1145 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1055	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
12 June 2013	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1640 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1750 hours over Naqurah.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2125 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Juniyah, Beirut and its suburbs and Jubayl (Byblos), then over Beirut and its suburbs again before leaving at 1310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over the sea off Kafr Killa.
	1615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1805 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
13 June 2013	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Naqurah.
	2000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 0610 hours on 14 June over Rumaysh.
	2030	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2150 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
14 June 2013	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
15 June 2013	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and heading north. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, and Hirmil before leaving at 1620 hours over Rumaysh.
16 June 2013	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Naqurah.
	0950	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1135 hours over Naqurah.
17 June 2013	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Beirut and Dahiyah before leaving at 2350 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
18 June 2013	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2215 hours over Naqurah.
	1135	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
19 June 2013	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1355 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2115 2155	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over Lebanese territorial waters off Tyre as far as Ra's Naqurah, releasing heat balloons.
20 June 2013	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2020 hours over Naqurah.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled between Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1405 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1700 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
21 June 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1530 hours over Rumaysh.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1815 hours on 22 June over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 June 2013	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 June 2013	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
		They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Kafr Killa.
24 June 2013	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1250 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Juniyah, Jubayl, Beirut and Matn before leaving at 1440 hours over Naqurah.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1745 hours over Rumaysh.
	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0255 hours on 25 June over Naqurah.
25 June 2013	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2015 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Naqurah.
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0030 hours on 26 June over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1650	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
26 June 2013	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1410 hours over Rumaysh.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1955 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2040 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1405	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
27 June 2013	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1330 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0905	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1055 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Akkar before leaving at 1340 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over the sea off Tripoli in the direction of Turkey.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2020 hours over Rumaysh.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1620 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1625	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1720 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1715	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0740 hours on 28 June over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over the sea off Shikka before leaving at 0700 hours on 28 June over the sea west of Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 June 2013	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. It circled over Baalbek and Naqurah before leaving at 1345 hours over Naqurah.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0820	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1210	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1330 hours on over the sea off Naqurah.
	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1905 hours over Rumaysh.
	1810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0710 hours on 29 June over Rumaysh.
	1830	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1955 hours over Naqurah.
29 June 2013	0510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2215 hours over Rumaysh.
	1900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1320 hours on 30 June over Kafr Killa.
30 June 2013	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2130 hours over Naqurah.
	1235	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1455 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1450	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0500 hours on 1 July over Naqurah.